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Communist China and Continuing Coexistence

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Current History

Founded in 1914 by
The New York Times

Published by
Current History, Inc.

Editor, 1943-1955:
D. G. REDMOND

DECEMBER, 1960
Volume 39 Number 232

Publisher:
DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

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year. Canada 7 dollars twenty-
five cents a year. Foreign in-
cluding the Philippines 7 dol-
lars seventy-five cents a year.

Coming Next Month...

WEST EUROPE AND CONTINUING COEXISTENCE

January, 1961

In January, we conclude our three-part study of the cold war and the balance of power with a seven article analysis of the problems faced by Western Europe, and its role in the struggle for continuing peaceful coexistence. Articles include:

PROGRESS TOWARD INTEGRATION, by *Karl Loewenstein*, Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science, Amherst College and author of *European Union* and other works;

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SPAIN AND WEST EUROPE, by *Arthur P. Whitaker*, Professor of History, University of Pennsylvania and author of *The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline*;

ITALY AND WEST EUROPE, by *William C. Askeu*, Department of History, Colgate University.

WATCH FOR OUR STUDY OF
THE EVOLUTION OF
AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE,
COMING IN FEBRUARY, 1961

Published monthly by Current History, Inc., Publication Office, 1822 Ludlow St., Phila. 3, Pa. Editorial Office, Wolfpit Rd., Norwalk, Conn. Entered as second class matter May 12, 1943, at the post office at Philadelphia, Pa., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright, 1960, by Current History, Inc.

Current History

Vol. 39

DECEMBER, 1960

No. 232

Today, because Communist China's ever-growing strength creates a potential threat both for the West and Soviet bloc, we turn in this issue to an examination of Red China and its influence on the world balance of power. Our introductory article sounds a pessimistic note: There is a "possibility that China might start a major war in which she would undoubtedly have less to lose than the Soviet Union or the United States."

China and the Two Great Powers

By WERNER LEVI

Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota

WHAT IS the influence of the People's Republic of China upon the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union? This question arouses considerable interest in all parts of the world—evidence of the phenomenally rapid rise of China to the position of a world power. How did China achieve this position when only two decades ago she was essentially a pawn of the big powers? The likely answer is that the present leaders, by an effective exploitation of nationalism, resentments from the past, Communist ideology, and the craving for a better livelihood, combined with an intense devotion to their country according to their own lights, have been able successfully to conclude the work begun by preceding regimes over the last 100 years.

China's nationalism, the primary force behind Chinese international ambitions, is young and vigorous. As a mass movement it is less than half a century old. Even the Communists found it necessary, at times, to undertake a propaganda campaign to replace a lingering regional or cultural patriotism with a political national consciousness. The aim of Chinese nationalism, determined by grievances arising from foreign dominance long before the Communist regime, has always been to rid the country of foreign pene-

tration and control, so that China could regain her place as an equal or superior partner among the nations and restore the political strength, imperial standing and leadership in Asia to which she felt entitled by rights of past grandeur and tradition. Mao Tse-tung surely expressed the feelings of patriots when he exclaimed in the fall of 1949: "Our nation will never again be an insulted nation."

The Communist government is inspired, like its predecessors, by the traditional concept of China as the Middle Kingdom, the central and superior power of the Asian world. When Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, at the Geneva Conference of 1954, proclaimed, in effect, an Asian Monroe Doctrine, presumably with China as its protagonist, he expressed in modern terminology an old Chinese idea, more discreetly nurtured by earlier governments. After achieving the initial goal of full sovereignty, Chinese nationalism, like all big-power nationalism, aims at imperial greatness, usually rationalized as a search for security, the fulfilment of a higher mission, or the restoration of historical rights. The resulting manifestations of Chinese foreign policy are therefore, in principle, neither peculiarly Chinese nor Communist, and, in the context of modern Chinese history, their main novelty is that they are now

real while in pre-Communist days they remained mostly a dream and a plan. One of the reasons for this novelty is that success could only result from the effects of a cumulative effort in which successive Chinese governments participated. A second reason is the enthusiasm, determination and ruthlessness applied to Communist internal and foreign policy, due presumably to the fanatic certainty inspiring the Communist leaders in the pursuit of their goals. ("In the end the socialist system will replace the capitalist system," asserted Mao Tse-tung in 1957 in Moscow. "This is an objective law independent of human will.")

In this respect, at least, a pretentious doctrine like communism affects the execution if not the formulation of foreign policy. Whether there are further, more substantial effects is doubtful. For Communist doctrine fails to offer prescriptions useful for any immediate and practical need. The Communist policy-maker has to rely on traditional methods; the doctrine lends itself conveniently to many interpretations, covering all practical requirements. If the broad and general terms in which it is formulated should ever prove inadequate, Communist leaders from Lenin down built the requisite loopholes into the theory. It was Stalin who assured his followers that "Marxism does not recognize immutable conclusions and formulae, binding all epochs and periods." Mao echoed by qualifying his foreign policy statements as being "true in China" and "under present conditions."

Especially in international relations, ideology becomes more often than not the handmaiden of national goals and a tool in the struggle for power, because the major objectives of foreign policy are set by the system of nation-states, regardless of any political system. Communist states share with other states the demand for national sovereignty and independence. The means to achieve and maintain these are limited and not usually subject to ideological preferences. In the final analysis, the criterion for foreign policy formulation in every state is not the advancement of ideology but survival. This subordination of ideology is well illustrated by the pursuit in the last 10 years of what the Communist government, in a manner very

similar to that of earlier governments, considers the Chinese national interest.

Nationalistic Goals

Immediately following the seizure of power in 1949, the Communist government's foreign policy was obviously influenced by the flush of victory and its endeavor, within the limits of its ability, to realize some major, primarily nationalistic goals. These included the demonstrative elimination of Western dominance (conceived to be maintained by the non-Russian Western nations) and the unification of the country, including many outlying territories, such as Tibet. Chinese support of North Korean aggression in 1950, followed by direct intervention, also was evidence of a nationalistic drive to restore and secure the empire. When Chou En-lai announced that his country could not permit the use of Korea as a springboard for the invasion of China, he expressed a Chinese policy of long standing: i.e., preventing Korea from falling into inimical hands (and China's original support of aggression may well have rested upon this consideration). Taiwan and Indochina policies are similarly part of the aggressive, nationalistic pattern. For, like Korea, these areas had belonged to the Chinese Empire and were separated from it by war only about 100 years ago or more recently.

Ideologically, this aggressive policy could be justified as part of the "inevitable" struggle between the socialist and the capitalist camp. But since this struggle is considered "ultimately inevitable," it was also possible, ideologically, to switch to a more pacific policy when this served Chinese purposes. This swing came with the Korean truce of 1953, the Indochina truce of 1954, and the Bandung Conference of Asian and African nations in 1955, reaching its propagandistic high point in the peaceful co-existence policy under the symbol of *Panch Shilah*, the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.

This new behavior allowed the Chinese to consolidate their gains, devote more energy to internal developments, and, hopefully, to slow down the forceful American reaction to Chinese aggressiveness. Peaceful coexistence proved very appealing to the non-committed

states of Asia and Africa and allowed China to sign a number of political and commercial treaties with these states, enhancing her prestige and political position in Asia. Under the cover of peaceful gestures and confessions, the Chinese prepared for further expansion by aggressive means in such areas as Laos, Tibet, Burma and India and by economic means in many other parts of Asia.

China was "ready" to resume open aggression, as her foreign minister put it bluntly to Prime Minister Nehru, in 1957, although she continued to cover up by talk of peace, in conformity with Mao's prescription that "the united front and the armed struggle" are the two weapons "to storm and shatter the positions of the enemy." Most of China's actions are justified in Peking not by ideology but by history, in the belief that thereby they become more acceptable to China's Asian neighbors. This leaves Communist doctrine unblemished by involvements with aggression while retaining its value as a flexible political instrument in the fulfillment of China's ambitious goals in Asia, where violence is, theoretically, not very acceptable. Although herself aggressive and imperialistic, China can continue to employ Communist ideology to attack the United States as an "imperialist" and "warmonger," propaganda she has found effective among some Asian countries. There are, however, weightier and more traditional reasons for Chinese animosity toward the United States. ,

Chinese experience with Western imperialism has left a strong impression. Since before 1900, it has served as the main source of nationalist inspiration. For at least half a decade Chinese diplomacy was preoccupied with elimination of Western dominance. There was never much effort to make fine distinctions among the various Western powers according to the degree of their imperialism; otherwise the United States would have emerged with the cleanest record. As the strongest power in the world and therefore the only effective opponent to Chinese ambitions in Asia, in other words, for practical political reasons, the United States now is made to carry the onus of all Western imperialism of the past. By expediently identifying the United States with capitalism and imperialism, the Communist leaders can

rally their people against this "enemy," make their people more receptive to their policies, arouse them against the Western world, and consolidate their regime.

The Enemy

For Communist purposes, making the United States China's greatest enemy was almost indispensable and the price was relatively small. The Communists were confronted, in 1949, by an inevitable choice between Russian imperialism in Manchuria and inner Asia and an American determination to stand by the Nationalists and prevent a Communist Chinese sweep across free Asia. Alone, China could not have realized her ambitions. She could hardly expect much aid from the United States, while the Soviet Union since 1945 had gradually added material assistance to her moral encouragement. When Mao Tse-tung decided to "lean to one side" (the Russian), he and his fellow leaders may have done so as a matter of course.

Yet the arguments they used to justify this step before the people indicate quite clearly that they had also calculated the interests involved, and that they expected very concrete returns from their friendship with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the declaration of open hostility toward the United States has led to a struggle for power in the free parts of Asia which has predominantly influenced the political, economic and military policy of the United States in Asia.

When the United States abandoned hope, after 1947, that a strong Nationalist China could be used as a balance against the power of the Soviet Union in Asia, and turned to Japan instead, there prevailed the belief that China for some time to come would remain a power unable to affect significantly and actively the course of international events. In 1950, the American government announced that America's security required a defense perimeter passing from Alaska through the chain of islands off the China coast to the Philippines. Korea's fate was to be left to the United Nations. The colonial and independent states of Southeast and South Asia were to be immunized against communism by economic aid and, presumably, kept safe by their metropolitan powers.

The containment of Communist China

was the basic goal of this strategy. The United States was obviously reluctant to become militarily committed in any area other than the perimeter. But the unexpectedly vigorous and aggressive Chinese foreign policy changed this reluctance into hesitant acquiescence when the United States needed the collaboration of some friendly powers in the Pacific for the success of her policy. The first extension of American commitments came in 1952 when a defense agreement was signed with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand in return for their signatures on the Japanese Peace Treaty. While these nations were primarily concerned over the revival of Japan, the United States insisted upon the peace treaty and the accompanying defense agreement with Japan as a move to discourage Chinese aggression.

The growing success of the Communists in Southeast Asia destroyed American hopes that the colonial powers could cope with the guerillas. American military aid, especially to Indochina, increased, as did economic aid everywhere in Asia. The greater Chinese freedom of maneuver after the Korean war benefited the Communists in Indochina, leading to their victories there and to the Geneva Conference in 1954. Aware that the Chinese were not too weak to exploit Western weakness and conscious of great pressure from Australia, the United States decided to enter into a collective security agreement, Seato, for southeast Asia. Thus the United States committed her power in Southeast Asia and closed the chain of collective defense arrangements around the Communist world, with India the only missing link among the important powers.

This evidence of American determination to fight, if necessary, presumably discouraged more outright Chinese aggression. (Except, significantly, in areas where the American commitment did not apply!) More important, China was given time to make mistakes. Chinese aggression in Tibet, India and other areas brought about a degree of disillusionment with communism that years of American information programs failed to produce. An opportunity has thus arisen for the free states of Asia to consolidate and strengthen themselves. But it is clear that in the foreseeable future, only American com-

mitments in south and southeast Asia can succeed in keeping the area out of Communist control. This area turns out to be just one section of that vast Communist front stretching from the Elbe to the Pacific whose further advance neither the United States nor any other free power can tolerate.

The vastness of this front and the enormity of the power behind it have induced the wish in the West that somehow it might be broken up, preferably by a split between the Soviet Union and Communist China (although the increasing extremism of Peking has provoked second thoughts and the question has arisen whether it might not be a good thing for the world if a more moderate Moscow could keep its ally under control). Since both powers are totalitarian dictatorships, there is no certain way of knowing what the relations between them are.

There are those who see cracks in the Communist wall and those who do not. The trouble with finding evidence for either position is that one has to rely on flimsy circumstantial evidence, such as which Russian official has been sitting on Mao's right or his left during an official party or who was not there at all; or the facts can be interpreted both ways: when China occupies Indian territory and Moscow is neutral about it, are the Chinese trying to sabotage the Kremlin's peaceful co-existence policy? Or do the Russians want to help China by soothing world fears and softening reactions?

Ideological Affinity?

Since it is certain that both powers formulate their policies to suit their own interests, the safest way to guess the nature of their relations is to discover what they consider their interests to be and how these may conduce to cooperation or conflict. Within that framework, ideological affinity has its significance. But it would be risky to exaggerate this or even to assume that it could outweigh the reality of national interests. When the Chinese Communist theoreticians allowed for sovereignty of nations and its support by nationalism (called "proletarian patriotism") they allowed for the conduct of international relations according to the ambitions and practice of states over the past several hundred years.

Ideology may create sentimental bonds and a certain similarity in outlook and in interpretation of national interests. But it is only one of the factors shaping relations between China and the Soviet Union. And since neither of the two powers is engaged in abstract ideological crusade but is, rather, using ideology as one instrument of power, ideology may well become a cause of conflict. Indeed, the practice of interpreting Communist doctrine according to its political usefulness has led to more open differences between Moscow and Peking in the allegedly ideological sphere than in any other. The Russians and Chinese have disagreed on such matters as the possibility of "contradictions" between governors and governed in a Communist state; the need for and degree of dictatorship of the proletariat; the development of communes and the transition to communism; and, lately and especially, the possibility of peaceful co-existence between capitalist and socialist states.

In all these questions, China has taken an independent and, usually, a more fundamentalist and radical position. These differences can be explained as the result of individual tactics in the use of ideology for political purposes, internally and externally. In other words, although clothed in ideological terminology, these are political differences. The interests leading to these differences would, however, have to become very serious before the two parties would risk endangering the political usefulness of communism beyond the Communist bloc or the benefit which each tries to reap from close cooperation. Mao may therefore speak truthfully when he asserted in September, 1960, that solidarity with the Soviet Union remained China's "fundamental policy."

The Soviet Union is interested in having on her borders a nation that is friendly and unable to challenge her security and hegemony. But since China interprets friendship according to the aid she can obtain to make her strong, Soviet and Chinese interests are

fundamentally incompatible in the long run. Moscow must follow a difficult path, giving China enough aid to retain her good will and not so much as will make her a potential threat. That path is bound to end somewhere in the future. Where that point is will be decided by either China or the Soviet Union.

Until China is or thinks she is largely self-sufficient in vital skills and materials, the Russian quasi-monopoly in aid to and trade with China makes that country so dependent upon the Soviet Union and the presence of tens of thousands of Russian experts in every field of activity in China¹ gives the Russians so much actual and potential control and influence in China that the cost of a Chinese withdrawal from close cooperation becomes increasingly greater.

The possibility of Russian pressure upon areas of Chinese interest in inner Asia is an additional guarantee that China will be reluctant to break up the friendship. China's inability to pursue her interests more forcefully in the direction of the Soviet Union (in Sinkiang, Mongolia, even Manchuria) is somewhat compensated by Soviet support of Chinese expansion in east, southeast, and south Asia. Soviet support of China helps both by forcing the West to disperse its forces from Europe to Asia. Moreover, Russian aid to China will permit the Soviet Union to take a good deal of the credit for those Chinese successes which seem so impressive to the Asian and African peoples, although the Chinese are carefully emphasizing their own contribution to the victories of the "socialist camp."

It is in China's interest and also in the Soviet Union's interest to exploit, each for her own reasons, their cooperation and to leave undamaged the political usefulness of communism.

To the Chinese, the alliance with the Soviet Union has paid good dividends. Russian backing has enabled them to expand their influence aggressively in various parts of Asia. Russian aid in men and materials has been an indispensable factor in Chinese progress. It has, apparently, not been forthcoming in the desired quantities; yet, not a fraction of it could have been obtained from the West. In Manchuria, Sinkiang, Mon-

¹ In August, 1960, reports began to reach the Western public that whole trainloads of Russian experts were leaving China. This could be taken as possible evidence of rising friction between the Soviet Union and China. There were other minor events which could serve the same purpose, such as the disappearance of a Chinese journal, written in Russian, to foster friendship between the two countries, and the reduction of space in Chinese newspapers reporting on the Soviet Union.

golia, where Russian and Chinese interests have traditionally clashed, the Chinese have been able to make some advances in restoring their influence.

This is part of the price the Soviet Union has to pay for Chinese friendship. But it may also have been the result of China's bargaining power which, at the moment, lies in her weakness rather than her strength. This power rests in the possibility that China might start a major war in which she would undoubtedly have less to lose than the Soviet Union or the United States. It may be this power which China is presently trying to apply to its maximum effect when she insists that peaceful co-existence with capitalist states is not possible. For the Soviet Union could not stay out of such a war; she would have to come to China's aid.

China also exerts pressure upon the Soviet Union by taking independent ideological positions, thereby not only creating precedents with political implications appealing to Russian satellites, but rivalling the Soviet Union as the "fatherland" of communism, in Asia,

Africa and Europe. The respectful treatment Moscow granted China even in the days of Stalin indicates that the Russians have feared just such a development and have tried to avoid it.

Thus, the two most powerful nations in the world, the United States and the Soviet Union, are obliged to shape their foreign policies with due regard to the People's Republic of China. The Chinese government will presumably interpret this as an encouragement to continue its current course. To the Chinese people, this will be a matter of pride which enhances the value of the government in their eyes.

Werner Levi has traveled and lectured on several occasions since World War II in India, Siam, Malaya and Australia. His books include *Free India in Asia*, *Modern China's Foreign Policy*, and most recently, *Australia's Outlook on Asia*.

"In trying to understand today's complex and turbulent Africa, a word of caution must be spoken against easy optimism, against harsh scepticism, and against facile analogies. . . . A genuine revolution is under way in Africa, and no man has ever definitely analysed a revolution while it was taking place. . . .

"In what mood is Africa entering this period of its history? Societies that have broken away from the dominion or constraint of nineteenth century imperialism are almost uniformly possessed by a deep urge to vindicate and justify their independence by some signal posture, ambition or achievement. They are unconsummated or unsaturated societies. They differ greatly in their attitude towards the Western world which was the focus of colonial and imperial power. The extremes are marked by China and by India. Communist China is an unconsummated and unsaturated power obsessed by a great sense of resentment against the Western world. China may therefore be driven to find satisfaction for past indignity and deprivation by a sort of counter-imperialism through military conquest and territorial expansion. This makes China a far greater source of unsettlement in the modern world than even Russia.

"The manner and the spirit in which independent India entered modern history in 1947 are a great tribute to British statesmanship and also to the British universities.

"India is showing a way which Africa may hopefully follow. She has a special authority amongst coloured and colonial peoples. That she does not have a flaming desire for retroactive revenge provides the agitated world of Africa with an example and a warning against the voices of Khrushchev, Mao Tse-tung and Nasser. . . ."

—C. W. de Kiewiet, *President of the University of Rochester, in an address delivered July 7, 1960.*

Discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese government, G. F. Hudson writes that at the present time the Chinese Communist leadership is not faced with any opposition. Thus far, continues this authority, Mao's "prestige as founder of the regime has been so great as to enable him to overcome all dissensions among his followers without wholesale proscriptions such as marked the reign of Stalin in Russia."

The Stability of Mao's Regime

By G. F. HUDSON

Director of Far Eastern Studies, St. Antony's College, Oxford University

THE POLICIES of the West are at present framed on the assumption that the Communist regimes in Russia and China are firmly established for as far ahead as it is practical to make plans and that these two powers are, and will continue to be, strong enough to hold in line the satellite Communist states of Europe and Asia. It is wise for Western governments to act on this assumption; in the past nothing but disappointment and frustration have ensued from wishful expectations of an imminent collapse or radical transformation of totalitarian political systems. It is possible, nevertheless, that the pendulum has now swung too far the other way, and that repeated disproof by events of predictions of the approaching demise of Communist governments has produced too great an unwillingness to consider even the possibility that something might go seriously wrong for one or more of them.

It is worth while from time to time, without indulging in excessive hopes, to take note

of the weaknesses which show themselves in the political structures of the Communist world, bearing in mind that the events of October, 1956, in Poland and Hungary took the world by surprise and that the great purge in Russia from the summer of 1936 onwards came at a time when it seemed to most foreign observers that Stalin had successfully surmounted the strains and stresses of the first Five Year Plan.

Today the Soviet Russian regime is in a much stronger position than its Chinese partner. The development of its industry has enabled it to permit its subjects a rise in their general standards of living which seems marvelous to them after so many years of deprivation and hardship. The sputniks and luniks gratify national pride and glorify the government which has produced them. Militarily, with intercontinental missiles, nuclear weapons and heavily armed conventional forces, the Soviet Union is one of the two superpowers of the world and carries weight as such in world affairs.

China, on the other hand, remains industrially an underdeveloped country, and although rapid strides in industrialization are being taken with the "great leap forward," the cost for the Chinese people in hardship, sacrifices, overwork and nervous strain is certainly not less than the similar forced industrialization was for Russia 30 years ago. China has as yet no nuclear weapons and cannot astonish the world by sending rockets to the moon; in the event of war it depends

Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford University, from 1926 to 1954, G. F. Hudson served for seven years with the British Foreign Office, 1939-1945. An Editor of *The Economist*, he is also author of *Europe and China: Their Relations in History to 1800* and *The Far East in World Politics*.

on Soviet military protection just as in time of peace it depends on Soviet economic aid. China is not a satellite of Russia as Poland and Hungary are, but for that very reason its present position is the more humiliating and unsatisfactory.

The smaller countries of Eastern Europe which have been dominated by Russia since the war are far from reconciled with their lot, but at least they recognize that in area and population they are of secondary rank and could not be numbered among the greatest powers in any re-ordering of world affairs. The Chinese, on the contrary, are possessed by the idea that they are the most numerous nation in the world—a fact of which their education and propaganda continually remind them—and are destined to be the greatest. The backwardness of their former “feudal” rulers and the aggressions of Western powers have in their view prevented them from assuming their rightful position in the modern world. But under the leadership of the Communist party and Chairman Mao they are now forging ahead towards their future pre-eminence, and in the meantime they are not disposed to submit to what they regard as derogatory treatment from any quarter, not even from Moscow. Unfortunately for Chinese aspirations, a position of exclusive dependence on the Soviet Union has not produced anticipated results, either economically or politically.

Revolution and Chinese Nationalism

The Communist revolution in China differed profoundly from its Russian exemplar in its relation to the national factor. In Russia the original Bolshevik leadership was essentially internationalist in its outlook and did not hesitate to destroy Russian fighting power against Germany in 1917 on the principle that “the enemy is at home.” The Bolsheviks’ appeal was not to the patriotism, but to the war-weariness of the Russian people and in order to consolidate their power they were ready to make a separate peace with Germany at almost any price. Only later was communism in Russia combined with Russian nationalism; then party history was rewritten to minimize the element of rational defeatism in the early phases of the Revolution and to present the Bolshe-

viks as the heirs of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. In 1917, it was the dogma of class war and the vision of a new society that were effective; there was no preoccupation with the question of national power, because Tsarist Russia in 1914 had already been one of the six great powers of Europe, and outside Europe was a conquering imperial state, not a victim of colonial encroachments.

In China, on the other hand, although (as in Russia) the preaching of the revolutionary utopia had its effect on a war-torn and poverty-stricken population, the social message was from the outset combined with and, indeed, subordinate to a fervent propaganda for national resistance to real or imaginary foreign foes. A disintegrated China was to be reunified and regenerated on a basis of anti-imperialism. The humiliations of the preceding century were to be wiped out, all foreign influences eliminated, and a strong and powerful state created through a centralized authority and an all-embracing discipline. This part of the Communist program made a potent appeal to the Chinese intelligentsia and middle class even where they had no liking for theories of economic collectivism—the more so since the Communists initially appeared to be so moderate in their economic policies.

It was the war against Japan that gave the Chinese Communists the opportunity to emerge from the insignificance to which they had been reduced by Kuomintang repression in 1936, and organize the peasantry over wide areas. They were indeed no more a party of national resistance than the Kuomintang, but at least they did not make themselves responsible for a Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, as did the Russian Bolsheviks, and their guerrilla technique enabled them to dominate the countryside behind the Japanese lines whence the regular Chinese armies and political authorities had been driven out.

When Japan was finally defeated, the anti-imperialist theme was abruptly switched to anti-Americanism. This transition, which was so hard for Americans in China at that time to understand, was a logical consequence of the premises of Chinese communism. How indeed was a movement centered on anti-imperialism to survive and grow if

there were no longer any imperialists? All Chinese Communist propaganda since 1945 has been directed towards fixing in the Chinese popular mind the image of America as a ruthless aggressor bent on the enslavement of Asian peoples. And the image has never been more necessary for the party than in the current period of the "great leap forward," when the Chinese people are being called on for prodigious efforts and sacrifices without visible immediate reward. This is a time when the drums of patriotism must be beaten most loudly, and the idea of mortal danger from beyond the frontiers must be most intensively propagated; only by rallying round the Party and Chairman Mao can China pass through the era of national peril and attain an invincible greatness.

The Alliance with Russia

Such cultivation of fear and hatred for an external foe is undoubtedly well suited to the end of preserving the authority of the Communist party in a period of maximum domestic tension, but it has also its disadvantages in China's actual international situation. The basic assumption of Chinese Communist policy has been that the hostility of the United States, which Peking has done everything to aggravate in all possible ways, is offset by the alliance with the Soviet Union and the economic and military aid it implies. The Russian alliance certainly served Communist China well during the Korean war and might do so again in similar circumstances. But recently the limitations of the alliance from Peking's point of view have become increasingly manifest. Russia, while giving theoretical support to Peking's right to "liberate" Formosa, has very definitely not so far been ready to risk a major war to assist and cover an invasion of Formosa in defiance of the protecting American Seventh Fleet. For the Chinese Communists, the fraternal support of the Russian comrades thus remains lacking, with regard to the most important objective of their foreign policy.

Further, for the last two years the Chinese Communists have not been able to count on the unqualified and uncompromising antagonism of the Soviet Union to the United States. The intentions and calculations of Khrushchev in his strange lines of sales talk

to the American people remain a matter for controversy among observers of the Soviet scene. But it can hardly be doubted that the Soviet leader has envisaged some kind of deal with the (or an) American government which would loosen the ties of the United States with Western Europe. In such a negotiation between two principal powers each of which has allies, there must be the most complete confidence in the loyalty and capacity of the statesman acting on behalf of the bloc if the allies are not to worry that the deal will be made somehow at their expense.

President Eisenhower was respected by all allied governments as an honorable man and took great trouble to consult them at each stage of the negotiations leading to the summit; even so, there were apprehensions in European capitals that he might have been persuaded to concede too much to the wily Soviet dictator in the talks at Camp David. Yet it is unlikely that any alarm felt by an ally of America at that time could have been comparable to the disquiet felt by Mao Tse-tung at the *tête-a-tête* between his Communist comrade and the chief representative of the imperialist camp, with whom his country does not even have diplomatic relations. It is in the nature of the Communist system that leaders have a most profound distrust of one another. Since the moral scruples and restraints which in the West serve to limit the effects of personal struggles for power or rivalries of state interests are dismissed by communism as mere bourgeois conventions, there can never be any assurance that a politician reared in this *milieu* will be kept from the grossest betrayal simply by a sense of decency.

The career of Khrushchev in particular has been one of such duplicity that it would give Mao ground for suspicion of his reliability as a champion of Chinese interests in a Summit negotiation even if Soviet policy hitherto had been consistently considerate of Chinese wishes and aspirations. But Soviet policy has for some time past been treating Communist China in a most cavalier manner, especially in relation to the principal Asian neutrals, India and Indonesia. Russia and China as Communist states undoubtedly have a considerable common interest in wooing the Asian neutrals and keeping them

away from political combinations sponsored by Western nations. But the attention paid by Russia to India and Indonesia has gone far beyond the limits of a diplomacy inspired by a common Sino-Soviet interest; it bears all the marks of an endeavor to extend Soviet influence in Asia at China's expense. This attention has not been reduced, but rather intensified since the outbreak of serious political quarrels between China on the one hand and India and Indonesia on the other.

On his tour of India and Indonesia last autumn Khrushchev did nothing but boast of Russian achievements without any praise of China and, as far as can be ascertained, he did not even in private talks try to plead China's case with his hosts. He made matters worse by repeated public suggestions that India and Indonesia should attend future summit conferences along with China as representatives of Asia, thereby repudiating the special status claimed by China as one of the Big Five, a status recognized at the end of World War II by permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council and in the exclusive Council of Foreign Ministers. That the Russian attitude in this matter was deeply resented by the Chinese Communists was indicated by their press and radio treatment of Khrushchev's tour; it was almost entirely ignored, whereas if it had been regarded as a series of good will visits on behalf of the Communist bloc as a whole, it would certainly have received the most enthusiastic publicity.

The behavior of the Soviet leadership in this and other matters can hardly be explained by a mere lack of sensibility or tact; it indicates only too clearly a Russian desire to put the Chinese in their place by classifying them on a level with other Asian states which do not even share the Communist ideology. Far from wanting to exalt the Chinese in Asia and make them exclusive partners in world affairs, the Russians want to clip the claws of the dragon and keep the new and ultimately dangerous great power of the Far East surrounded by countries in which Russian influence will be stronger than Chinese.

The Chinese can see this very well, but for the present they are unable to do anything about it; they have neither the economic ca-

capacity to compete with Russia in aid to other Asian countries or the military power to coerce them without Russian backing. Disputes over frontiers and Chinese overseas communities would make it difficult for them to have good diplomatic relations, even if they were less arrogant in their dealings.

Chinese-Soviet Split

Chinese Communist resentment at Russia's failure to recognize China's special status in Asia and fear of a Russo-American deal which would leave Peking in isolation have recently produced on the ideological plane a challenge to Soviet leadership of the Communist world in terms of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The Kremlin is accused by implication in Chinese polemics of having abandoned Lenin's teaching on imperialism and the inevitability of war in favor of "revisionist" ideas emanating from excessive fear of nuclear war. Khrushchev's affirmation of "peaceful co-existence" as an aim of foreign policy is condemned as illusory if pursued as anything more than a temporary tactic, and it is suggested that he was hoodwinked by the imperialists in his approaches to America last year and will be again if he resumes his summit diplomacy.

This campaign, however abstract the arguments used, has made clear two things: China's refusal to accept decisions of Soviet Communist Party Congresses as binding on other Communist states and its resolute opposition to any rapprochement between Russia and America which might lead to agreements not depending on Chinese consent. Superficially this attitude may seem incompatible with the frequent Chinese references to the "socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union." But in fact the recognition of the leading position of the Soviet Union—which the Chinese delegates urged at Moscow in 1957 against the contentions of the Poles and Yugoslavs that all Communist states were equal—is dependent on the Soviet Union's willingness to lead the camp against the enemy; it is in fact another way of asserting the division of the world into two irreconcilable armed blocs. Russia forfeits its leading position as soon as it leaves the path of Marxism-Leninism as defined by the Chinese Communists and enters into any sort of pact with the imperialist enemy.

It may be assumed that the risk of incurring plausible charges of treachery to the Communist cause is not without effect on Soviet policy, the more so since there appear to be many people in positions of influence in the Soviet Communist party who are also apprehensive about the possible consequences of too much "relaxation of tension." However, on the general issue of policy Khrushchev has been holding the better cards. He has been able to rally to his side all the European satellite Communist parties and even the Communist party of North Vietnam. He has also the power to cut off or reduce Russian economic and technical assistance to China and thus slow up or even wreck the current Chinese program of industrialization. It may thus be that Khrushchev will be able to force Mao into some kind of recantation, or at least that the Chinese criticism will be silenced. Such an outcome would nevertheless leave the deeper conflict unresolved. This grows out of the fact that Chinese national pride and ambition are inherently too great for Russia. The logic of Communist theory points towards a world state; there should be both a central planning authority and a single oracle for the promulgation of doctrine; neither economy or ideas can be left, as in a liberal order, to free competition. But if there is to be a supreme authority, it can in the Russian view be located only in Moscow; conscious of their power and success, inordinately boastful about their achievements, and contemptuous or patronizing towards countries which are still underdeveloped, the Russians are not disposed to brook rivalry from Peking nor are they even capable of a tact which would avoid wounding the sensitive *amour propre* of the Chinese.

Mao's Position

All this, however, means fundamentally that the foreign policy of Mao-Tse-tung and the Chinese Communist party has been a failure. The basic assumption of that policy was that China could afford to defy and antagonize the Western powers because there would be in compensation complete military, economic and political support from the Soviet Union. If now Chinese interests are being ignored, neglected or insolently overridden by the Soviet Union, and if the dependence of the Communist regime on Soviet support

is too great for Peking to be able to make effective protests, sooner or later the leadership will fall into discredit with all those whose national feeling is stronger than their Marxism. It is after all Mao who insisted on the principle of "leaning one way" in international affairs and who has led China into its present situation.

The tensions with Russia cannot be concealed or overlooked in China, even though the censorship can prevent any public comment on them. Coinciding with the great strain imposed on the nation by the current economic policy, these tensions may drive certain individuals, outside the central leadership but in positions of influence, to seek a way out which would restore to China both an internal relaxation and a freedom of maneuver in international affairs. As things are in China today, such an initiative can only come from the army. But there are signs, from exhortations addressed to army officers to conform more willingly to party directives and give up objections to detailed party supervision, that all is not well in relations between the army and the party. A somewhat similar situation existed in Russia in 1937, and fear of a *coup d'état* then led Stalin to carry out his great blood purge of the Red Army. Without it he might well have been overthrown, but as it was, the military power of the Soviet state was gravely weakened on the eve of Hitler's bid for hegemony in Europe.

If Mao has to resort in the near future to blood purge methods within the apparatus of government in order to keep himself in power, it would signify a decline of his personal authority, for hitherto his prestige as founder of the regime has been so great as to enable him to overcome all dissensions among his followers without wholesale proscriptions such as marked the reign of Stalin in Russia. But on the evidence available the crisis for the regime in China is hardly less severe than it was in Russia in the early 1930's, and it would be surprising if the political hypertension combined with disillusionment over the imagined fraternal unity of the "camp" did not lead now in China to an unrest similar to that which threatened Stalin's rule a quarter of a century ago. This time the disaffection might have a different outcome, especially if Mao's life were to

come to an end, or his health break down, while the present state of affairs continues. No successor could have at the outset Mao's personal prestige; and a struggle for power at the top of the party in present circumstances could be disastrous for the regime.

There can be no doubt but that the Chinese Communists through their splendidly organized propaganda have been able to work up in the Chinese people both a great hatred of the United States as the imperialist enemy and a great enthusiasm for the industrial construction that is to make the China of the future both powerful and prosperous. Both these emotions strengthen the dictatorship of the party and cause the Chinese people to submit to its heavy-handed control. But if the myth of the solid array of the Communist

world against imperialism is undermined by the realization that Chinese cannot count on Russia for loyal support, and if for the next few years the "great leap forward" continues to promise the Chinese people jam tomorrow, but gives them no jam for today, there will certainly be an increase of discontent together with a waning of the hope and faith by which the regime has hitherto maintained itself. The brief episode of the "Hundred Flowers" period, when the lid was for a moment taken off political discussion, showed how widespread in reality was opposition to Communist party rule. That opposition has been driven underground, but hardly extinguished. The party remains strong and ruthless, but the indications are that its time of greatest crisis lies ahead of it.

"If we could accept the idea that the leadership of the free world is ours by necessity and that an essential ingredient of that leadership is recognition that we are in a long-term struggle, we could plan ahead within a framework that would give us some chance of ultimate success. A willingness to develop policies of a long-term character would enhance our influence and enable us to a large extent to set the terms of our struggle with the Soviet Union, instead of constantly operating policies of an emergency nature conceived as reactions to Soviet initiatives.

"We could, for example, be thinking in terms of promoting the creation of a common market for the nations of the free world. Surely unless we pull together economically, we will not be able to *compete* economically with the Soviet bloc which has managed to eliminate trade barriers extending from the Baltic to the Pacific. We have experienced instances of severe Soviet competition in recent years in tin, in aluminum, in benzine and, more recently, in oil.

"Long-term planning to win this struggle surely calls for the creation of more closely integrated political and defense machinery. What an incalculable waste of manpower, brains and wealth is involved in our policy of requiring the British and the French to duplicate so much of our defense hardware. Even more extravagant are the research and development programs in the field of missiles and nuclear physics.

"To resist effectively the ever increasing pressure of the Communist world, it seems to me the free world must develop the machinery for coordinating its military, its economic and its political activities. The divergent and often conflicting policies of the several nations of the free world are unlikely to prevail over the long pull against the united power and purpose of the Communist world. The free world, by a large margin, excels the Communists in material resources and trained manpower. What it lacks is the acceptance by its people of a single purpose and the means to put such a purpose into effect.

"As we have been in the past we are still in the present frustrated. We are frustrated by a cruel dilemma which demands that we either take the lead in creating a united free world which is repugnant to our traditional, historical isolationism, and also certainly will be costly, or we sit by and watch the Communists extend their power and influence, as they have in Eastern Europe, in Asia, in Cuba and Latin America, and today in Africa."—*J. W. Fulbright, United States Senator, in an address on August 23, 1960.*

"... Chinese leaders, forced by internal pressures, want to keep expansion into Southeast Asia a live option," warns this writer, underscoring the fact that the Communist Chinese claim that "Chinese communism is the way for the transformation of Asian and African countries to the perfect society."

Chinese Communism for Export

By AMRY VANDENBOSCH

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THE basic policy of Communist China toward the countries of South and Southeast Asia remains the same, but its tactics vary from time to time and from country to country. Communist China continues to make a tremendous impact on this region, both positively and negatively. Its rapid economic development attracts these underdeveloped countries, while its increasing military power and veiled and overt threats frighten them.

Until 1959, Communist China sought to attract the peoples of the region by its peaceful coexistence propaganda and policy of sweet reasonableness. By these tactics Chou En-Lai achieved a notable triumph at the Bandung Asian-African Conference of 1955.

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He played every note calculated to arouse a hearty response from the members of the conference—anti-colonialism, the right of self-determination, anti-racialism and peaceful coexistence. The Indonesians were pleased and impressed by his willingness to solve the vexatious problem of the dual nationality of the Chinese in Indonesia, though Indonesian second thoughts about the terms of the treaty, which supposedly solved the problem, were not so favorable. By endorsing the policy of neutralism to which most of the countries represented at the conference were committed, Communist China won favor and promoted its own interests. For the moment it was enough if Southeastern Asian countries could be kept from joining the enemies of communism; later efforts could be made to draw them into the Chinese orbit, by ardent wooing or intimidation as the situation might require.

In 1959, there was a change of tactics. The insurrection in Tibet and its ruthless suppression were followed by military pressure on the indeterminate Indian border; measures by Indonesia adversely affecting the Chinese in that country met with sharp protest from Peking; in Laos internal Communist pressure was stepped up, apparently by encouragement and support from the Chinese satellite, North Vietnam. The reasons for the change in tactics are not easily discerned. By the nature of things Communist China would sooner or later overrun Tibet and reduce it to an integral part of the Communist state and this, in turn, would alter relations with India. Another explana-

tion for the new toughness in foreign policy may be found in internal troubles, chiefly crop failures in the last two seasons. If this is an important factor in bringing about the change of tactics it may be ominous, for control of the rice surplus-producing countries on its southern border is an obvious solution to the problem of feeding the enormous and rapidly-growing Chinese population.

This may also help to explain the divergence in lines which emanate from Moscow and Peking. Russian leaders, realizing the grave dangers of war by the new weapons, have shifted to the peaceful coexistence theme, while Chinese leaders, forced by internal pressures, want to keep expansion into Southeast Asia a live option. This may account for Communist China's recent emphasis on the continued threat of Western imperialism to prepare the ground for action to "save" the countries of the region from this dire threat. To stimulate the internal pressure of communism in these countries the Chinese are striking a new and interesting note.

The Indian Subcontinent

The ruthless suppression of the Tibetan revolt and the occupation by the Chinese army of disputed areas on the Indian border shocked the Indian nation and put a severe strain on its neutralist policy. Nehru's leadership on this issue came in for sharp criticism and voices demanded a change of policy. Relations between the two countries deteriorated rapidly. Popular feeling was so stirred up over the Chinese actions in Tibet that the Indian government could not deny the Dalai Lama asylum on its territory, though the act was bitterly criticized by Peking as unfriendly. The Indian government is in an anomalous position. It recognizes China's sovereignty over Tibet, yet it is deeply sympathetic with the revolt of the Tibetan people. The Dalai Lama's presence in the country is somewhat of an embarrassment to the Indian government. He has been warned not to set up a government-in-exile but his activities have, nevertheless, had a semi-political character which is highly displeasing to Peking.

Indian confidence in the wisdom of the policy of neutralism has been shaken, but not to the point of abandoning it. Some

modification of Nehru's views and of India's foreign policy is however discernible. After his talks with Chou En-lai in New Delhi in April, 1960, Nehru wearily admitted to Parliament that there had been "no meeting ground at all" and that he had been faced with a "hard rock" of views entirely different from his own. Pressure from China has led to an improvement of relations with Pakistan. The two countries have settled most of the border and financial disputes which have been a source of constant friction between them ever since partition in 1947 and have also reached a temporary agreement regulating the use of the Indus River and its main tributaries for irrigation. A project calling for the joint use of the waters of the Indus River system and the construction of a huge dam for both irrigation and hydro-electric power may soon get under way. The project, developed by the World Bank, will be financed by the United States, Great Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and West Germany. President Mohammed Ayub Khan of Pakistan has advocated a joint defense agreement between the two countries, but this proposal meets with no response from Nehru.

Communism also lost favor by its misrule in Kerala and in the election in February, after the central government had removed the Communist officials from office, the Communists were decisively beaten. However, unless India can rapidly expand its economy and improve the level of living, internal Communist pressure will again increase. While the dispute with China has made the Indians more aware of the threat which confronts them on their border, it has also, unfortunately, diverted public revenue from economic development, where it is desperately needed, to military defense.

Pakistan has had little trouble from Communists internally. Field Marshal Ayub's military regime has done much to improve the morale and economic health of his country, but Pakistan is still confronted with grave political and economic problems, and unless these can be solved within a reasonable time communism may well become a force.

When a country acquires its political independence by active resistance to the colonial ruler, a revolutionary spirit may develop and continue after freedom is won. On Ceylon

the shift from dependency to national independence took place peacefully and practically without any friction. Yet the situation in Ceylon is precarious. This is due to economic and social factors. The island has one of the highest per capita incomes of Asian countries but it must import nearly half of its food requirements. Its prosperity is largely tied up with three export crops—tea, rubber and coconut—which make the economy of the country highly dependent on world market conditions. In 1952, when Ceylon was desperately in need of rice and the price of rubber was rapidly declining, Peking offered a five-year agreement to exchange rice for rubber on very favorable terms. The situation enabled Communist China to use trade as an effective instrument of foreign policy and propaganda. The exchange agreement, which has been renewed yearly since 1957, had considerable propaganda value, as it seemed to present clear evidence of the great economic achievements of which the Chinese Communist regime boasted.

Ceylon had a moderate and pro-Western government until 1956 when a coalition government under S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike came to power. The election campaign, in which race, religion, language, domestic and foreign policies were issues, was waged bitterly. The chief appeal was to the Buddhist Sinhalese, who constitute nearly 70 per cent of the population, with a policy of "Sinhalese only." The moderate parties were badly beaten in the election; Bandaranaike formed a cabinet which included two Marxists (Trotskyites). Foreign policy was shifted to neutralism, measures to nationalize segments of the economy were instituted, and Sinhalese was made the official language. The large Indian minority felt itself driven into a corner; in 1958 bloody communal riots broke out. On September 27, 1959, Prime Minister Bandaranaike died of wounds inflicted by a Buddhist monk.

There have been two elections this year, one in March and one in July. The Rightists won a resounding victory in the first election, but they were badly divided and the Senanayake government was defeated on a vote of confidence on the Speech from the Throne on April 22. In the second election, Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom Party,


with his widow as the leader, won enough seats to give it a slight majority in Parliament, and she became Prime Minister. Her government has announced that it will nationalize the largely Western-owned insurance companies and the tea and rubber plantations. Shortly after taking office the government announced that it would nationalize the national newspapers. While no official reason was given for the decision, it is generally attributed to the fact that the entire national press had supported the moderate United National Party.

In addition to taking a large share of the island's rubber production, Communist China in 1957 made Ceylon a grant of approximately \$16,000,000 to be used during 1958–1962, primarily for the improvement of its rubber plantations, and in 1958 it made the Ceylonese government a loan of \$10,000,000 for the rehabilitation of flood-damaged areas. These sums are not large in absolute terms but they are not small from the point of view of the receiving country or of the national income of the granting state.

Burma

Burma's policy toward China is largely characterized by a determination not to provoke its large and increasingly powerful neighbor. This calls for caution and restraint, in view of the large number of potential issues between the two countries, among which are the presence of a considerable body of Chinese in Burma and its increase by illegal immigration, China's support of Communist-infiltrated parties and of an active though divided Communist party and Chinese encouragement for Kachin separation. A dangerous and long-standing border dispute was settled by a new boundary treaty negotiated during the past year. Premier U Nu visited Peking in October for the formal signing of the agreement.

In the elections held on February 6, 1960, U Nu's "clean" faction of the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League won a decisive victory. In April, civilian government was restored under the former prime minister, U Nu, who in desperation in October, 1958, had turned over the government to General Ne Win when a bitter struggle within the dominant party threatened the country with chaos. It is generally conceded that the 18-



—From the Department of State Publication 6954, March 1960, Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, page 3.

month administration of General Ne Win was salutary. The rebel groups have been almost completely suppressed and economic conditions have improved. By accepting an offer of a \$37,000,000 gift made by the United States in 1959 Burma reversed its six-year old policy of refusing any more American economic aid.

The "Committed" Countries

Malaya, Thailand, South Vietnam and the Philippines recognize the threat of Communist infiltration and subversion and China's military power and have aligned themselves with the West. None of them has recognized the Chinese Communist regime. In the Philippines the Communist guerillas had, in 1950, a force of 20,000 armed men; today they have about 300 and only half of them armed. Thailand, with a large Chinese population, is very conscious of the danger from the north and the northeast. There has already been some Communist infiltration on the part of the Vietminh among the large Vietnamese minority in the poor, northeastern part of the country. Should Laos fall under the control of the Communists the position of Thailand would become very difficult.

Cambodia is in a class by itself. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who rules the country, on or off the throne, blows hot and cold. One day he patronizes the Communists, the next day he turns against them. Cambodia's neutralism leans toward the Communist side. Prince Sihanouk and other Cambodian officials speak critically of American "imperialism" and have made wild charges of United States' involvement in plots against the Cambodian government. The fact that Cambodia is involved in border disputes with its neighbors, South Vietnam and Thailand, both of which are strongly pro-Western, has not helped the anti-Communist cause. Chou En-lai made a state visit to Phnom Penh in May. Cambodia is receiving \$28,000,000 in economic aid from Communist China, which is being used to construct a radio station, a textile mill, a cement plant, a paper mill and a steel plant. There may be reason in the Prince's strange antics, for his country is also receiving economic aid from France, Russia, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Japan and the United States.

Laos

From an economic and military point of view the country of Laos, with 91,000 square miles and only about 2,000,000 inhabitants, would be no great prize for either side in the world struggle. It has few known resources, few roads and no railroads or good air fields. But politically and psychologically it is of very great importance. Its capture by the Communists would put Thailand, Cambodia and South Vietnam under extreme pressure. The character of its terrain and its proximity to Northern Vietnam make it relatively easy for the Communist Vietminh to aid dissidents along the border.

There can be little doubt that Peking and Hanoi had much to do with the Pathet Lao insurrection in the summer and fall of 1959. The sub-committee of the Security Council of the United Nations was not able to affirm the charge of the Laotian government of participation by Vietnamese troops in the fighting but it indicated North Vietnam had provided military supplies. The fighting diminished markedly with the presence of United Nations representatives in the country. However, strange events occurred in 1960. After a political and constitutional struggle with a young reform element in his cabinet, Premier Phoui Sananikone resigned on December 31, 1960. The army took over, and on January 7, King Savang Vatthana named a non-political figure to head the government until elections could be held. In the elections held in April the anti-Communists won nearly all of the parliamentary seats, but the Leftists charged election irregularities. On August 9, army rebels headed by a young paratrooper, Captain Kong Le, took over Vientiane, the administrative capital of the country and immediately proclaimed a neutralist foreign policy. Captain Kong Le in a radio broadcast charged that infiltration by "a great power," an obvious reference to the United States, was increasing daily. The Royal government in Luang Prabang threatened drastic action against the rebels but entered into negotiations with them.

On August 15, the King appointed Prince Souvanna Phouma as the new prime minister. As premier in 1957, Phouma, a neutralist, had tried to make peace with the Pathet

(Continued on page 350)

Warning that if Communist China develops nuclear weapons, "the West will be faced with the gravest challenge," this authority stresses the fact that "the army of Communist China remains a formidable opponent for any nation in any conventional war."

The Armies of Red China

By ALLAN NANES

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ALTHOUGH in the closing year of their civil war the Chinese Communist army swept over those of the Nationalists, it took the Korean war to impress its prowess on American consciousness. In that bitter conflict the Chinese Red troops fought the United Nations forces on generally even terms. Few GI's who heard the Chinese bugles or faced the "human wave" charges will ever forget the experience.

Whether as a result of the Korean struggle or not, the tendency ever since has been to evaluate the Chinese Communist army as a formidable fighting force. Some would say that this estimate is exaggerated, on the grounds that the full weight of American power could not be brought to bear in Korea. Yet it is obvious that as the primary arm of a nation of over 600 million, tightly organ-

ized and determinedly led, the army of Communist China must be reckoned with by diplomats, military planners, and indeed, the people of the world.

Information on this force is hardly abundant. The Chinese do not have the American penchant for revealing military developments. In addition, the absence of American correspondents from mainland China has diminished the amount of information that might otherwise be available.

Despite these circumstances, some facts can be gleaned about the Chinese Red army. Thus there is a widespread consensus that it amounts to 2.5 million men, a figure that the Chinese themselves uncharacteristically confirmed when Defense Minister Lin Piao gave out this figure on February 18, 1960.¹

The army, or as it is known, the Land Army, is broken up into from 30 to 35 armies, composed of two to three divisions each. These Chinese armies are obviously comparable to what would be called an army corps in this country. The active strength of each of these armies is 50,000 to 60,000 men. In wartime they would be grouped together by region to form what the Chinese call a Field Army.

At the division level the Chinese Communist army is said to contain from 102 to 115 infantry divisions, two or three of armor, and one or two airborne.² Obviously, the emphasis is on infantry, a fact which is to some degree illustrative of the army's history, but

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¹ *Survival*, Vol. 2, No. 4, July-August, 1960. London, Institute of Strategic Studies, p. 141.
² *Ibid.*

also, as we shall see, a product of some of the doctrines of Chinese Communist leadership. Finally, the government of the People's Republic can draw upon a manpower pool of no less than 125 million men of military age.³ Between 500,000 and 750,000⁴ are called up each year, and serve for a three year term. Thus one may conclude that the Chinese Communists have all the manpower they could ever need to fight a conventional war.

Supplementing the army in villages, plants, communes, and so forth, is the militia. This vast agglomeration is provided for in the constitution of the communes, under which all able-bodied men between 16 and 60 are to be trained in the use of arms. In reality, the militia is open to women too.⁵ Although the militia's total strength is not known, the government's declared goal is to enroll one person out of every three. A two year old report said the total membership was approaching 200 million.⁶

The precise military role of the militia is undefined. Presumably it would be used to harass any invader, should one ever gain a lodgement on the soil of the mainland. But such evidence as is currently available suggests that the militia is designed primarily to serve as an instrument of political control. Although training of militiamen has been stepped up, only small groups are issued arms, and then only for relatively short periods of time.⁷ Rifles, machine guns and grenades have been issued for weapons training, but apparently no live ammunition.⁸

Finally, the Chinese Communists have public security forces of approximately 200,000 men. Presumably these are for purposes of internal order and suppression of political opposition. It should perhaps be equally presumed that they possess some military capability in the event of an actual conflict.

Central Direction

Administrative direction of the army is exercised by the Minister of Defense, who is advised by a National Defense Council. In addition, there is a general staff, which appears to be under the Ministry of Defense.⁹ Directives governing the army are published in the name of this ministry. This machinery for the centralized direction of the military is patterned on the Russian model.

Yet this centralization is the culmination of an evolutionary process. During the long era of Communist eclipse, from the late 1920's until the end of World War II, there was no rigid central command. A People's Military Council, headed by Chu Teh, exercised what was at best a nominal authority over the scattered, largely guerrilla units. During the struggle with the Kuomintang the People's Liberation Army was organized, and Chu Teh was made its Commander-in-Chief. Here again the centralized command was more apparent than real, as regional Communist commanders operated with a substantial degree of independence.

Once victory had been achieved, however, the new Communist government of China, in the process of consolidating its power, decided to reorganize the military establishment. A People's Revolutionary Military Council was set up, directly under the People's Government Council of the Central People's Government. In 1954, when a new constitution was proclaimed, the Chairman of the People's Government Council became ex-officio Chairman of the new National Defense Council, and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The original holder of all these offices was, of course, Mao Tse-tung, the only Communist leader who has written extensively on military affairs. It is interesting to note that more than one-fifth of the membership of the National Defense Council consists of ex-Nationalist generals, but the Defense Minister and all seven vice ministers are Communists.¹⁰

Yet if centralization of defense administration has been achieved, it is apparent that those who administer defense policy are not its actual authors, except insofar as they are privy to the highest echelons of the Communist party. This is certainly true of the Soviet Union, and undoubtedly of other Communist nations as well. In no country does it apply with more force than in the People's

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ The lower figure was more generally quoted in the sources consulted, but *Survival*, the latest source used, gives the higher figure.

⁵ Oct. 19, 1958, p. 8.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *New York Times*, Feb. 16, 1960, p. 6.

⁸ *Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 24, 1958, p. 3.

⁹ Chiu, S. M. "Chinese Communist Military Leadership."

Military Review, March, 1960. Vol. XXXIX, No. 12, p. 63.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* This paragraph relies largely on Dr. Chiu's article.

Republic of China, where defense policy has been, and continues to be, subordinated to the strategy and objectives of the Communist party. Thus political considerations intrude into an area as purely functional as the army's internal organization, to say nothing of its position in the domestic scheme of things. It goes without saying that they play a paramount part in any assessment of the army's role in China's position *vis à vis* the Soviet Union, and the entire non-Communist world.

Modernization and Guerrilla Warfare

In a purely military sense, Communist China's first job is a dual one, namely, the creation of a thoroughly professional officer corps and the transformation of what was largely a guerrilla force into a coordinated, modern fighting machine.¹¹ The reorganization of the command structure, outlined above, was one step toward the latter end. The creation of a twelve grade structure for officers, and the retirement of older officers, were two steps toward the former.

But this attempt at professionalization has encountered occasional ideological snags. For one thing, what might be called the "guerrilla mentality" seems to survive among some of the older Communist leaders and officers. The result is a tendency to deprecate the need for modernization. Chu Teh, for example, has acknowledged the importance of technology in war, but has asserted that politics, political systems, and what is in people's hearts make the difference between victory and defeat.¹² While this sentiment would be widely shared by many non-Communists, in its particular context it may well be a reflection of a conviction that the tactics that have brought success to Chinese Communist arms in the past will yet be valid in the future.

The guerrilla experience impinged on the drive for modernization in other ways. For one thing, the experience gave the Communist army a character that was perhaps more democratic than is usual in military establishments. This tradition clashes with the attempt to build up an élite officer corps. Furthermore, there is always the ideological risk, from the Communist point of view, that such a military caste might be transformed

into a vested interest potentially antagonistic to the purposes of the party. One can imagine that this would give pause to party chieftains.

Finally, and perhaps most obviously, the army's past experiences influence its views on tactics. The mountainous terrain and the lack of good roads militated against mechanized forces in the past, and those conditions still obtain. Airpower was never too effective against the Communists' guerrilla tactics, so they do not appear too concerned about airpower now.¹³ This downgrading of airpower, bred out of their experience, foreshadowed the apparent lack of apprehension with which the Chinese seem to view nuclear weapons today.

How the army is affected by internal needs is perhaps best illustrated by the use of the army as a labor force. Since China's fundamental weakness is economic, the party has been desirous of using the army in construction and production work. The military professionals have not been at all keen about this, but in effect they have had to go along. Thus we get reports of the Red Chinese army contributing 40 million man days building factories, working on water conservation projects, and so forth.¹⁴ The head of the army's general political department has said that all men must give one to two months each year to this work.¹⁵

The use of the army in this manner is intimately connected with the "generals to the ranks" movement, in which all army officers lacking fighting experience were to serve as privates for at least one month a year. As a result, army officers as high as generals have served in companies, and have participated in economic construction. The theory behind this campaign is that those who run a state must know what it's like to be subject to one's directives down to the lowest level.¹⁶ This presumably will help them run it more efficiently. But one can see why its effect on army training and morale might be questioned.

When we turn to Red China's relation-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹³ "Substance Behind Peking's Shadow." *Washington Star*, March 20, 1960, p. B-3.

¹⁴ *New York Times*, Feb. 3, 1960, p. 2.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, April 26, 1959, p. 22.

¹⁶ *New York Times*, April 16, 1958, p. 13.

ships with the Soviet Union, the impact of Communist strategy, Russian and Chinese, bears most heavily on the army. Soviet Russia is indisputably a main prop of Chinese military strength.¹⁷ China is certainly not in a client state relationship to the Soviet Union, but there is little doubt that outside assistance, principally Russian, is required for the achievement of its economic goals. Since the state of technological and industrial development is so intimately linked to military power, the Soviet Union has been in a position to influence, and one could almost say, to control, Chinese military development. Characteristically, she has not been hesitant to employ this leverage. Furthermore, this Chinese-Soviet interplay has been carried on coincident with a struggle between Peking's military professionals and party dialecticians. The result of all this maneuvering, needless to say, is of critical importance to the West.

Nuclear Arms for China.

The issue which is most illustrative of this conflict, and at the same time most vital, is that of nuclear arms for the Chinese Communist army. Given what seems to be the aggressive stance of Red China, the threat to world peace would be increased enormously if her army were to be furnished with these weapons. Yet interestingly enough, probably because of their own industrial deficiencies, Chinese Communist pronouncements at first tended to disparage the role of nuclear weapons. In a speech in 1955, Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, then Defense Minister, appeared to cling to the concept of the long war of attrition.¹⁸ The General Staff, composed of old line Communists, favored large scale forces in being, and placed a high valuation on Soviet deterrent capabilities.

In effect it was Soviet possession of nuclear weapons that gave the Chinese Communists a flexibility of maneuver that they did not possess on their own. But the reverse of this coin was that the Russians possessed a veto over Chinese strategy. Never was this shown more clearly than in the offshore islands crisis of 1958. The fact that the Chinese provoked that crisis, but never forced the United States to decide to use tactical nuclear weapons, meant that the Chinese would not accept the costs of taking the offshore islands, and that

Moscow would not permit the crisis to go to the point where its own deterrent could be invoked on Chinese initiative.¹⁹

This crisis also served to bring to a head the difficulties between the Chinese "new" military professionals and the party. The former were dissatisfied with the showing of the armed forces, because their bluff had so obviously been called, and the lack of military means to achieve political objectives had been exposed. The upshot was the appointment of Lin Piao, a veteran Communist military leader who managed to enjoy the confidence of the younger military professionals, as Defense Minister. His appointment is significant, for it means that the party hierarchy wants to bridge the dangerous gap that had developed between it and the military men. It means that a strong effort will be made, and probably is already being made, to modify the Chinese Communist forces in line with latest military techniques, while continuing to maintain party control.

In accord with this development we can expect continued Chinese pressure on the Russians to acquire a nuclear capability. Thus far, despite some Khrushchev bluster, there is no hard evidence that the Russians have furnished any nuclear weapons to the Chinese.²⁰ If they persist in their refusal, the Chinese may be moved to try to manufacture nuclear weapons of their own.

There are good grounds for believing that the Russians would be no keener about that than would the West. Indeed, a case can be made out that the Soviets have tried to limit the Chinese military capability to a defensive one. For example, while the Chinese have a first line airforce variously estimated at 2,000 to 2,500 planes, most of these are fighters, and largely obsolescent MIG 15's and 17's at that. The Chinese bomber force is composed of sub-sonic IL 28's, an aircraft with a range of 1200 miles.²¹ Fuel supplies are low, hence training is inadequate,²² and the Soviets have not displayed a burning de-

¹⁷ Erickson, John. "Sino-Soviet Relationships. The Question of Strategic Combination." *Journal, Royal United Service Institution*, May 1960, p. 251.

¹⁸ Hsieh, Alice Langley. "Communist China and Nuclear Warfare." Reprinted from *The China Quarterly, Survival*, op. cit., p. 144.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

²⁰ *Washington Post*, July 8, 1959, p. A-6. Other sources consulted tend to agree.

²¹ *Washington Star*, op. cit.

²² *Survival*, op. cit., p. 141.

sire to rectify this situation. The result has been Nationalist air superiority, by and large.

But this thesis should not be pushed too far, for after all the Soviets have helped the Chinese double their production of military aircraft; they have supplied them with a short range missile capability; and they are said to be teaching them to build long range submarines.²³ If enough of these are eventually turned out, the capabilities of the Chinese Communist navy might be enhanced beyond its present purely nuisance value.

However Sino-Soviet ideological differences have now reached the point where the Soviet Union seems unwilling, at least for the present, to continue technical assistance to the Chinese. Western newspapers have reported a withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China. If these reports are authentic, then a sharp blow will have been dealt China's hopes for rapid economic and military advance.

Yet it seems premature to regard any current break as definitive. The Chinese and Russians both have a common interest in the solidarity of the "socialist camp." They both desire the victory of communism on a world scale. There is no evidence whatsoever that either country intends to yield its ideological ambitions.²⁴ The Soviets simply have a better understanding of the perils posed by nuclear war to the achievement of that objective. If the Chinese acquire these weapons they may perhaps acquire a better appreciation of their destructiveness as well. Unfortunately, at present they appear all too ready to use them, or to see others use them.

It should be apparent, by way of summary and conclusion, that the army of Communist China is in a state of transition. It survived for years as a guerrilla force, and finds it difficult to slough off the guerrilla tradition. Yet the younger men with professional military training feel it must become a modern force, equipped to use the most up-to-date weapons, including the nuclear. Thus there are reports that its tactics are being revamped, and even that its divisions are being changed to the United States pentomic type.²⁵ We know that its command structure has been altered, and may be altered again, and we know that an attempt is being made to develop an educated professional officer corps. We know that its logistical services have im-

proved, and that its firepower has increased,²⁶ the latter due in no small degree to Russian assistance.

This transition is accompanied by certain morale problems. Some younger officers are reputedly unhappy over the contrast in privilege and perquisites between themselves and senior military men. Conscripts have not always proven so ideologically conscious as the party would wish.²⁷ The élite of the army has not been keen over the party's desire to use the troops in construction work. Indeed, while the broader clash between the army and the party has been settled, it is probable that the army, particularly the young professionals, are not satisfied with the results.

Yet when all of this is taken into account, the army of Communist China remains a formidable opponent for any nation in any conventional war. Its manpower, its ability to use terrain, its endurance, cannot be discounted. True, it has weaknesses, even in the conventional sense. Its communications network is poor; for example there are only 10,000 miles of railroads.²⁸ China's vast masses have to be fed, and the production and transportation of a food supply that is marginal even in peacetime, could be seriously hampered in time of war. Nevertheless, it would be a brash Western military man who could contemplate with equanimity a land war against Communist China.

If this is the situation with respect to a conventionally armed Communist China, how much more dangerous would it be in the event that China acquired nuclear arms? Thus it is in the West's interests, no less than in Russia's, that the latter not furnish her Asian ally with these weapons. Should Russian policy change, or should Communist China succeed in producing her own nuclear weapons (a possibility with which we must reckon), the West would be faced with the gravest challenge of this challenging century. One can only hope that in this eventuality the West will display its greatest wisdom, and China its greatest restraint.

²³ *Washington Star*, *op. cit.* Jane's All the World's Aircraft has stated that Chinese Communist production of MIG 17's has doubled with Russian help.

²⁴ See Erickson, *Journal*, Royal United Service Institution, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

²⁵ *New York Times*, Sept. 18, 1959, pp. 1 and 2.

²⁶ Chiu, S. M., *op. cit.*, p. 66.

²⁷ *Washington Post*, June 29, 1958, p. A-6.

²⁸ *Washington Star*, *op. cit.*

Evaluating Communist China's progress, this specialist notes that "... even if the official figures have to be subjected to a heavy discount," the role of industrial progress achieved in 1958-1959 would still be substantial." The crucial question, as he sees it, is whether "the technological level that determines the quality of output can be raised."

Industrialization under Chinese Communism

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LI FU-CH'UN, Peking's chief of economic planning, reported officially at the end of March, 1960,¹ that Communist China's gross industrial output in 1959, including both the modern and the traditional sectors, was 39.3 per cent higher than the corresponding level attained in 1958. Since the annual rate of growth of gross industrial production in 1958 stands at the unprecedentedly high level of 66.2 per cent (1957 = 100) in official statistics,² if both figures are correct, it would appear that Communist China succeeded in more than doubling its industrial output within two years after the completion of its First Five Year Plan (1953-1957).

It will be recalled that this was the general objective set in 1956 for the last year of the Second Five Year Plan (1958-1962).³ More

specifically, according to the Communist planning authorities, of the 17 industrial goods for which control figures were determined in 1956, 11 succeeded in 1959 in reaching or approximating their Second Five Year Plan targets three years ahead of schedule. These official statistics lend clear support to the claim, as they are meant to do, that Communist China's industrialization is proceeding at a phenomenal and, compared with the 1953-1957 period, accelerated pace, and that the "great leap" initiated in 1958 is being carried forward without apparent slackening.

The Communists attribute their alleged success to the twin policies inaugurated in 1958; namely, the establishment of the multiple-purpose communes and the expansion of small industrial enterprises on a massive scale. Furthermore, the high rate of industrial growth achieved is frequently pointed to as an evidence of the correctness of their approach in deliberately pushing the expansion of a few sectors of the economy only, such as iron and steel production, in lieu of the principle of "balanced growth" advocated by the more moderate elements of the party and the domestic critics of present policy. It is argued that, as facts have amply demonstrated, one can induce the ex-

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¹ See Li Fu-ch'un's address to the Communist People's Congress, New China News Agency (NCNA), Peking, March 30, 1960.

² *Wei-ta ti shih-nien* (The Great Ten Years), Peking, September, 1959.

³ NCNA, Peking, September 28, 1956.

pansion of supply of other sectors of the economy through the artificially created additional demand for their products by exerting a "big push" on one segment of the economy only, and that successive movements of this kind propel the entire economy forward at a much faster rate than any coordinated movement of all the sectors of the economy in concert. If the official spokesmen of the Peking regime were to be taken at their word, one would receive the impression that these policies should be continued with little modification and that no serious obstacle now stands in the way of Communist China's becoming a major industrial power in an unbelievably short time.

Reliability of Communist Statistics

As usual, for the benefit of the unwary, a word of warning should be uttered in using official Communist statistics. The party slogan of the "great leap" era that "politics must take command" means in everyday language that statistics have been gathered and published since 1958 for the primary political purpose of substantiating the "leaping" claims. The injection of this added and openly announced political bias to an already over-taxed and fumbling statistical service which, out of necessity, is now staffed with many completely untrained Communist party zealots has further reduced the reliability of Communist statistics.

This state of affairs is especially true with respect to statistical reporting on agriculture, as may be seen from the down-grading of the 1958 crop production figures in August 1959.⁴ But it is probably equally true in the case of reports on industrial production originating from the numerous small enterprises run by the communes, counties, and other local authorities. At best, therefore, the official industrial output claims should not be regarded as anything more than the upper but somewhat improbable boundary of Communist China's possible industrial progress in 1958-1959.

The Experience of the Iron and Steel Industry

No attempt will be made here to arrive at a completely independent estimate of Communist China's over-all industrial production since 1958 in quantitative terms. But a reasonably accurate account of the vicissitudes of the country's industrial progress will

emerge if we examine with some care the twists and turns of official policy in the last two years. Such an analysis can best be made with respect to the iron and steel industry, the pivot of the "great leap" in the industrial sector.

When the small industry drive was first started, the *People's Daily*⁵ reported the government's plan to build 200 small Bessemer converters and 13,000 iron smelting furnaces before the end of 1958. This program was to add 10 million metric tons to the country's annual steel-producing capacity and 20 million tons to its capacity of pig iron production. Even higher figures than these, however, have been reported for the number of iron and steel furnaces under construction in the villages at one time or another. But a report of the same official press on September 1, 1959, credited the massive effort since the summer of 1958 with only 4 million tons of new capacity for steel and 10 million tons for iron. Moreover, while 11 million tons of steel ingots and 13.7 million tons of pig iron were reportedly produced in 1958, as compared with 5.4 and 5.9 million tons respectively in 1957, following the August, 1959, meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,⁶ it was disclosed that out of this larger amount only 8 million tons of steel and 9.5 million tons of pig iron were produced by "modern" methods suitable for industrial use. The remainder, it was said, consisted of "native" iron and steel which, though suitable for local purposes, would henceforth be excluded from the national plan because of the shortage of labor in agriculture.

In order to interpret this policy change accurately, one should bear in mind the basic economic justification of the massive drive to establish small industrial production units using labor-intensive methods and the determination to concentrate upon iron and steel in this movement. The idea is that since labor is the only resource China now possesses in readily available abundance, disregarding the additional human cost of pro-

⁴ See Hung-ch'i (*The Red Flag*), No. 17, Peking, September 1, 1959, for the text of the announcement of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

⁵ Peking, August 8, 1958.

⁶ See note (4) above.

longed hard work, any increase in production by using labor more intensively without a matching increase in consumption by labor would be worth while. Further, iron and steel were selected as the primary target both because of their symbolic value in popular notions of industrialization and because of their stimulating effect on the demand for machines and as an input for the machinery industry.

In deciding upon the policies of 1958, Mao Tse-tung may not have acted entirely intuitively. But he obviously underestimated the technical inadequacy both of the very small scale and of the "native" methods of production of the majority of these mass enterprises. If the quality of the iron and steel is extremely poor,⁷ as it in fact turned out to be, so that the real productivity of the labor-intensive methods is very low, the question must then be faced as to whether labor employed in the iron and steel drive should not at least be partly transferred to more profitable employment elsewhere, and whether production of iron and steel by "native" methods should continue at all. Since it was realized during the first half of 1959 that agricultural production during the preceding year was actually much less than the preliminary reports had led the Communists themselves to believe, partly due to labor shortage at harvest time—not to mention the gross statistical errors committed by the party zealots—and since bottlenecks in transportation, chemical fertilizers, and so forth, were also increasing in severity, the iron and steel drive could no longer go unmodified.

This situation accounted for the August, 1959, announcement which, as we can now see from the preceding analysis, was in effect an indirect admission that the critics were right in charging the small industry movement with being unproductive, wasteful of resources, and disruptive to other sectors of the economy.

The Revised Program

Several major modifications of the program of forced industrialization have been adopted as a result of the 1959 reassessment. Although they do not all represent entirely new elements in the regime's box of tools, these modifications and new emphases are more far-reaching than their slogans would

indicate and are fully incorporated both in the revised program for 1959 and in the production plan for 1960. Whether or not Communist China will be able to develop its industry at an accelerated pace will depend to a large extent upon the success of these efforts.

1. *Technological revolution and mechanization.* As a sequel to the partial failure of the 1958 iron and steel drive the Communists did not abandon their effort to establish small industrial enterprises on a massive scale. They have, however, tried to upgrade technology by substituting small "modern"⁸ enterprises for the small "native" or indigenous enterprises. Moreover, they have come to realize that the application of labor alone is not necessarily productive or economical, this being true both in industry and in agriculture, even though labor may appear to be an abundant resource and its use entails little direct incremental cost to the planner. To the Chinese planning authorities the answer now appears to lie in greater mechanization or partial mechanization, concomitant with continual innovations in production and management methods.

While some of the new arrangements such as the introduction of four eight-hour shifts in coal mining with overlapping time between successive shifts⁹ are really disguised ways of increasing the application of labor and of using existing plants more intensively, many other changes of a labor-saving nature have been reported. The broad scope of this movement, reaching down to the industries run by the communes, has now assumed the proportions of a major drive. Furthermore, as an integral part of the program, an increasing number of workers are now being sent to training schools.¹⁰

How important technological improvements are in converting a small "native" enterprise into a small "modern" enterprise may be seen from the large share of the small

⁷ See Yuan-li Wu, "The Communes in a Changing China," this journal, December, 1959, p. 348. Cf. also the author's article in *The New Leader*, New York, May 18, 1959.

⁸ We use the term "modern" here. The original Chinese expression means literally "foreign."

⁹ See Po I-p'o's report on the "technological revolution" in *The Red Flag*, No. 10, May 16, 1960.

¹⁰ According to Po, *ibid.*, the number of such trainees in 6 reporting cities and provinces increased by 24 per cent in early 1960 as compared with the year-end figure in 1959. 4.6 million workers in these areas were said to be taking vocational training at the university or high school levels at the end of February, 1960.

"modern" enterprises in the total output of certain industries. For instance, out of the 20.5 million tons of pig iron reportedly produced in 1959 a little over 50 per cent or 11 million tons were produced by the small "modern" blast furnaces of which there were about 1,300 in early 1960.¹¹ These "modern" plants were set up during 1958-1959 and some had grown out of the "native" iron smelting plants. Similarly, 4.72 million tons of the 13.35 million tons of steel produced in 1959, or about 28 per cent, came from the small Bessemer converters. The same figures imply that only 9.5 million tons of pig iron and 8.63 million tons of steel came from the larger iron and steel mills and that, compared with the corresponding 1958 figures (9.53 million tons of pig iron and 8 million tons of steel), there was in fact a small decrease in the former and only an 8 per cent increase in the latter. This is a far cry from the fairly large increase in iron and steel production between 1958 and 1959 announced in official reports that have conveniently overlooked the distinction between products of disparate qualities.

The Communist planners now intend to develop the small "modern" enterprises in a large number of industries such as coal mining, the production of construction materials, chemical manufacturing, and so forth.¹² Even in rail transportation, light cast iron and steel rails serving local transportation needs have been and are being laid on a large scale, some expressly designed to be make-shift arrangements pending the construction of more permanent structures when materials and engineers become available.¹³

The crucial question is that of whether these small and so-called modern enterprises, on which so much seems to depend, are good enough even if they are superior to the "native" enterprises of 1958. Official reports claim, for instance, that 80 per cent of the pig iron produced by the small "modern" furnaces was up to standard as of October, 1959.¹⁴ Another report claimed that 90 per cent of the small converter steel could be used.¹⁵ There are sporadic reports on significant improvements in the quality of various other products.

It is probably too early to speculate on the potentiality of such technical improvements. But at least one Communist author has been

candid enough to state that in the long run the significance of the small "modern" mass enterprise movement lies much more in the stimulation the enterprises give to economic development than in their own contribution to production.¹⁶ The small "modern" enterprises will no doubt serve as a good training ground for industrial labor to be employed in larger and more advanced enterprises later on. They also have an invaluable demonstration effect in disseminating the spirit of innovation. But their usefulness is predicated upon the attainment of certain minimum standards by their products, and, as of now, this is still a moot question.

2. *Cost reduction and austerity.* When the revision of the 1959 production plan was announced, the Chinese Communist party saw fit to publish a separate resolution calling upon the country's large and small enterprises to increase their efficiency and to effect cost reduction in terms both of labor input and of raw materials and power consumption. Stated in such general terms, this is of course nothing new. But the importance attached to saving labor per unit of output in addition to raw materials, power and so on is really a new departure and reflects the greater emphasis on mechanization and innovation discussed above.

The 1959 official party line also called for continued austerity which, as reaffirmed in the 1960 economic plan, means that there will not be any important expansion of industries producing consumer goods or any noticeable increase in consumption in the near future.¹⁷ Time rates will continue to be the rule while piece rates and bonus wages will only be used as supplementary measures. Thus the Communist party continues to hope that ideological indoctrination and political propaganda will provide the population with sufficient psychic compensation as the necessary incentive to uninterrupted hard work.

3. *Redressing disequilibrium and break-*

¹¹ See note (1) above.

¹² See Wang Ho-shou's article on the iron and steel plants in *The Red Flag*, No. 9, May 1, 1960.

¹³ See Lü Cheng-ch'ao's report on the local railways, *ibid.*


¹⁴ Reported by Li Fu-ch'un in *The Red Flag*, No. 1, January 1, 1960.

¹⁵ *Jen-min jih-pao* (*People's Daily*), Peking, September 1, 1959.

¹⁶ See note (12) above.

¹⁷ The recent sugar deal with Cuba may mean a slight increase in the domestic sugar supply as sugar production in Communist China has been lagging in plan fulfillment.

CHINA



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ing the production bottlenecks. Throughout the First Five Year Plan special emphasis was placed in Communist China on the development of industry, especially heavy industry. One of the results of this policy was the lagging development of agriculture. Besides, even within the industrial sector, certain specific shortages in industries such as metallurgy, machinery and chemical fertilizers persisted. The all-out attempt to increase grain production in 1958 was partly meant to redress the balance. But the commune movement has had a depressing effect on other branches of farm production, such as live-stock raising and vegetable production, while the actual increase in grain production itself, notwithstanding the official revisions of output statistics, is still subject to dispute.¹⁸ At the same time, the simultaneously executed "big push" in iron and steel, as we have already noted, has created new bottlenecks. It was under these conditions that the 1959 reassessment of economic policy was carried out.

Perhaps the most significant step undertaken so far in a seemingly determined effort to tackle the neglected laggards and bottlenecks is the admonition of the Communist planning chief that the primary responsibility of heavy industry in 1960 should be the giving of aid to agriculture.¹⁹ In fact, of the 203 "above norm" construction projects scheduled for the machinery industry in 1960, 55 are in the field of agricultural implements and machinery, such as the tractor plants of Lo-yang and Tientsin and the farm machinery plant of Peking. The production of farm machinery has been assigned 1.1 million tons of finished steel, an increase of 100 per cent from the 1959 quota.

Work is being continued on 17 large chemical fertilizer plants, as well as some 140 smaller plants, in an attempt to relieve this serious bottleneck. All the industries in the communes and at the county level are also reported to have geared their output to the needs of agricultural production²⁰ particularly in the production and repair of farm implements, farm product processing and so on.

Next, both the 1959 and the 1960 plans have listed a number of industries for special attention. These include iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, cement, lumber, acids and

alkalis, synthetic rubber, coal, coke, petroleum products and electric power, not to mention the machinery industry. An examination of this list shows that the emphasis is directed at two large categories—the production of fuel and power, which are essential for economic growth in general, and the supply of industrial raw materials especially needed for the metallurgical and machinery industries, construction and the manufacture of chemical products.

The lagging development of the Chinese oil industry is well-known. Although coal production in 1959 reportedly reached 347.8 million tons, probably only 80 per cent of the latter could be used. The shortage of power and industrial raw materials is in part responsible for the renewed drive to reduce their consumption. Finally, more attention is being given to the expansion of rail transportation. All these developments would seem to indicate the Communists' recognition that some form of balanced growth has to be maintained even though the "big push" on a narrow front may have a short-run stimulating effect.

The Second Five Year Plan

If we list the industrial products for which control figures for 1962 were determined in 1956 and compare them with the reported production figures in 1959, we find that of the 17 items given six had outputs in 1959 that were below their respective targets for 1962. These were crude oil, steel, chemical fertilizers, cement, edible vegetable oils, and sugar. Timber and aluminum ingots probably belonged to the same category. Of the remaining nine items only coal and power generating equipment were produced in substantially higher quantities than their 1962 targets. In the light of the discussion in the preceding section it is not surprising that with the exception of coal, the industries that were behind the planned goals correspond rather closely to the laggards and bottlenecks that are now being pushed.

But while our comparison yields a less favorable picture than the official claims, the

¹⁸ This problem was, for instance, discussed in some detail by John Lossing Buck, Owen Dawson, and the present author during the 1960 meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in New York.

¹⁹ See note (1) above.

²⁰ See Wang Yü-lo's article on the commune and county industries in *The Red Flag*, No. 6, March 16, 1960.

degree of plan fulfillment is by no means to be scoffed at. This is true especially if we take into consideration the even higher production targets of 1960. In other words, even if the official figures have to be subjected to a heavy discount, as in the case of iron and steel, the rate of industrial progress achieved in 1958-1959 would still be substantial. The Chinese Communists first set

tion now being engineered at a frantic pace. The rigorous control of consumption in the rural communes and urban areas has given the Peking regime an exceedingly high savings-income ratio.²¹ The small industry movement is said to have reduced the incremental capital-output ratio to two-thirds of what it was before.²² But all these improvements would be illusory unless the techno-

	Output Targets for 1962	Production in 1959	Planned Production in 1960
(in million metric tons unless otherwise indicated)			
Electric Power (billion k.w.h.)	40-43	41.5	55.5-58.0
Coal	190-210	347.8	425.0
Crude Oil	5-6	3.7	5.2
Steel (excluding production from the small mass enterprises)	10.5-12	8.6	*
Aluminum Ingots	0.1- 0.12
Chemical Fertilizers	3- 3.2	...	2.8
Metallurgical Equipment	0.03- 0.04
Power Generating Equipment (million k.w.)	1.4- 1.5	2.15	3.3
Metal-cutting Machine Tools (thousand units)	60-65	70	90
Cement	12.5-14.5	12.27	16.0
Timber (million cubic meters)	3.1- 3.4
Cotton Yard (million bales)	8-9	8.25	9
Cotton Piece Goods (million meters)	7,290-8,060	7,500	7,600
Salt	10-11	11	14
Edible Vegetable Oils	3.1- 3.2	...	1.7
Sugar	2.4- 2.5	...	1.3
Machine-made Paper	1.5- 1.6	1.7	...

SOURCES: Proposals on the Second Five Year Plan, NCNA, Peking, September 28, 1956, and Li Fu-ch'un's report on the 1960 economic plan, NCNA, March 30, 1960.

* The figure given for steel in 1960 is 18.4 million tons, including probably steel from the small "modern" enterprises.

their goal about three years ago to overtake the United Kingdom in the production of certain basic industrial products in about 15 years. They have since shortened the time to about ten years. It is not impossible that this target can be reached even though, considering the size of the Chinese population, Communist China would still be very far from being a highly industrialized nation.

A Tentative Conclusion

Finally, it should be stressed again that the most important single factor in determining the future of the Communist economic program during the next few years will be the degree of success of the technological revolu-

logical level that determines the quality of output can be raised. Should the technological revolution fail, the "boot-strap" operation of telescoping the industrialization process might yet be stalled.

However, the Communists may well succeed in their endeavor although many more years of hard work in addition to the two or three promised by Mao Tse-tung at the beginning of the "great leap" will be needed.

(Continued on page 366)

²¹ According to William Hollister, investment constituted about 33 per cent of Communist China's gross national product in 1959. Cf. Hollister's article in *The Realities of Communist China*, edited by Yuan-li Wu, a joint study issued by the Institute for Asian Studies and the Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Marquette University, Milwaukee, 1960.

²² See note (1) above. This means that for each additional unit of output the required capital investment would be only two-thirds of the original amount.

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Lao forces. Civil war threatened as General Phoumi Nosavan, pro-Western minister of defense in the ousted cabinet, began to march troops against the rebels. In this situation the Communist Pathet Lao again became active. On August 30, an agreement was reached between Prince Phouma and General Nosavan when the former offered to broaden his cabinet by including five members of the ousted pro-Western government. The new regime was immediately threatened by a revolt from anti-Communists in the south and another by the Communist Pathet Lao in the north.

The outcome is uncertain. Probably the best the West can hope for is a truly neutral Laos. A civil war, which would provide Communist China and North Vietnam with an excuse for intervention, would be tragic.

Indonesia

A puzzling situation prevails in Indonesia. Relations with Communist China have become strained but the Indonesian Communist party seems increasingly likely to profit from the trend of events. Since January 1, 1960, foreign retailers have been banned from operating in rural areas. This decree, which affects chiefly Chinese, has deeply stirred Peking and the Chinese communities in Indonesia. Overseas Chinese have been arrested, a few have been killed in disorders; Indonesia has protested activities of Chinese diplomatic and consular officials in supporting their compatriots and has requested the recall of two Chinese consular officials. Some 40,000 Chinese have been repatriated with many more scheduled to go.

In the meanwhile President Sukarno and the army are engaged in a strange contest. The President, who is now virtual dictator, is making a tremendous drive for national unification and insists that the Communist party be given a role in public affairs commensurate with its large membership. Communists have been given a larger representation in the new hand-picked parliament which replaced the suspended elected parliament. Since the President has declared a state of war, the Army automatically has great power. While the President's policy is to strengthen the position of the Communist party, the Army is busily engaged in curbing it and restricting all Communist activity.

The explanation of this contest may be that, at this stage, Sukarno needs the support of the Army, but is unable to control it, so he is playing the Army and the Communist party against each other. Probably to make sure that no clash between the Communist party and the Army occurred while he was out of the country, President Sukarno took with him to the United Nations General Assembly both Dipa N. Aidit, the boss of the Communist party, and Lieutenant General Abdul Haris Nasution, Army chief of staff.

What if Sukarno attempted a showdown with the Army, or the Army with him? Would he then call for the support of the Communists? And what would happen if the government should break up or disintegrate? As the strongest single, well-organized group, with aid from Peking and Moscow, the Communists might take over Java at least.

Khrushchev visited Indonesia in February. He apparently made no attempt to conciliate the dispute between Indonesia and China but sought to bring the former into closer relations with Russia by means of an agreement on economic and technical cooperation, a cultural agreement and the extension of a \$250,000,000 credit for economic aid.

The Chinese and Russian propaganda in Africa and the Middle East are pretty well integrated, though a slight divergence is discernible. Nasser met Chou En-lai at the Bandung Conference, was much impressed by him and was attracted by revolutionary China's achievements. The two countries entered into trade and cultural exchange agreements and, for a while, there was much talk in Egypt of applying "Chinese solutions" to all kinds of Egyptian problems.

Communist China in recent months has shown a keen interest in Africa. Many nationalist leaders, especially from the East Coast, have been invited to visit Peking. Large quantities of Chinese Communist publications are available in the bookshops, and Radio-Peking directs 70 hours of broadcasting a week to Africa. In September, President Touré of Guinea visited Peking and was rewarded with a loan of \$25,000,000 for a three-year period without interest. Thus it seems that as Russian communism represents the classic road to socialism for European societies, so Chinese communism is the way for the transformation of Asian and African countries to the perfect society.

Noting that "the potential for China's agricultural sector is tremendous," this author summarizes recent developments in Chinese agriculture, drawing on Communist Chinese and other reports and first hand observations after a trip to China in 1960.

Progress in Chinese Agriculture

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ON THE Chinese agricultural front, the period 1959–1960 assumes special significance as it may turn out to be a crucial one in the annals of agrarian development in China. It was in the year 1959 that the slogan "agriculture is the foundation" was introduced, and redoubled effort was made to match agriculture with the faster-paced industrial sector. This period witnessed, too, an unprecedented scale of natural calamities which affected each year about one third of the cultivated acreage on the Chinese mainland, and called for measures to cope with the challenge.

During the first Five-Year quinquennium (1953–1957), the annual rate of growth in the value of agricultural production was esti-

mated at 4.5 per cent, while that of industrial output came to 18 per cent. However, in 1959, the total value of agricultural output reached 78,300 million *yuan* (or \$33,246 million U.S.), at 1957 prices. This represented a 45.8 per cent increase over 1957, making 20.7 per cent the average yearly rate of progressive increase in agricultural output value during the past two years. The relative rates of growth between the industrial and agricultural output values during the First Five-Year Plan period was 4 to 1, and became 2.65 to 1 in 1958, and 2.35 to 1 in 1959, according to an article published recently in the *Ching-chi yen-chiu* (Economic Research) of June, 1960.¹ It is at present too early to tell whether the planned goal of 37,360 million U.S. dollars' worth of agricultural output for 1960 is to be fulfilled,² but anyway the rate of growth will be a higher one compared to the era preceding the Second Five-Year Plan (1958–1962).

From the author's recent visit to areas in South, Central, East, North and Northeast China between May and July, 1960, it was his impression that the current period will be of great import in the history of agricultural development in China. More specific points will be discussed later in the article, but suffice it to say here that although the Chinese planners are faced with a number of agricultural problems, revolutionary programs are being implemented with confidence; these

Chao Kuo-chün, while serving as Visiting Professor and Head of the East Asia Department at the Indian School of International Studies, University of Delhi, visited China during May–July, 1960. Some of the impressions he gathered on the trip are included in this article. A more detailed discussion of the Chinese agrarian problems may be found in his recent book *Agrarian Policy of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–1959* (IPR, N.Y., September, 1960, 399 pages). Dr. Chao is also the author of several other volumes on contemporary China, as well as a regular contributor to academic journals in America, Hong Kong, India, Japan, and Western Europe.

¹ Yeh Nung, "Agriculture Is the Foundation for the Development of the National Economy," *Ching-chi yen-chiu* (Economic Research), June 17, 1960, p. 10.

² Ma Chu-chen, "Chinese Agriculture Developing At High Speed," *China Today*, New Delhi, September 30, 1960, p. 10.

will eventually lead rural China further to modernization and socialization.

The first important feature, following the new emphasis assigned to agriculture, is the greater support given to the agricultural sector from all sides, particularly from industry. For example, the total supply of agricultural means of production in the category of heavy industrial goods in 1958 was 6.5 times that of 1952; in 1960, it has been estimated that there will be another 100 per cent increase or so over that of 1959, or over 10 times as much goods supplied as compared to 1952.³ While during the First Five-Year Plan period the amount of steel products (by modern methods) used in agriculture came to about 6.4 per cent of the total quantity of steel products consumed, the proportion increased to 7.4 per cent in 1958. In a similar manner, the annual average of steel products for manufacturing agricultural machinery was 75,000 tons during 1953–1957, but it rose to 156,000 tons in 1958, and to a still higher level in 1959.

The following Table will give an indication of the increased supply of means of production to some 24,000 people's communes in rural China:⁴

	1958	1959 (est.)
Tractors (in 15 h.p. units, including imports)	45,000	55,000
Machine-drawn implements	no data	100,000
Combine-harvesters	" "	4,500
Threshing machines	" "	7,500
Total capacity of power for agricultural machinery (h.p.)	1,600,000 (pumps only)	5,200,000
Chemical fertilizers (tons)	2,700,000	4,000,000(?)

During the First Five-Year Plan quinquennium, the output of industrial products destined for the countryside increased nearly three times in value. At the end of June, 1960, the nation's engineering works had turned out various types of irrigation engines totalling some two million h.p. and 125,000 pumps for farming use.⁵ In 1959, the state's supply of means of production to agriculture increased considerably over 1958—tractors by 29.2 per cent, mechanically drawn harrows by 114 per cent, horse power in draining and pumping machines by 112.2 per cent, and chemical fertilizers and insecticides

by over 60 per cent. The government advanced 1,000 million *yuan* [or \$424.6 (U.S.)] to the rural communes in 1958, and another 3,500 million *yuan* in agricultural loans in 1959.⁶ A report by Vice-Premier Ch'en Yi on October 1, 1960, stated, *inter alia*, that up to the end of August, 1960, the output of chemical fertilizers exceeded that of the corresponding period of last year by 120 per cent, chemical insecticides by 82 per cent, and agricultural irrigation machines by 48 per cent.⁷

Raw Materials from Agriculture

Agriculture, at the same time, is rendering service to the nation in increasing magnitude. In food grain alone, the amount supplied to industrial and urban areas during 1953–1957 came to 129.5 million tons. In 1958, 75.5 per cent more agricultural products were purchased by the state than in 1952.⁸ It was estimated in mid-1960 that about half of the nation's financial revenue was derived directly or indirectly from farm produce. In exports, 70 per cent were estimated to be made up of agricultural products or processed farm produce.⁹ The countryside also provided markets, in 1960, for about two thirds of the consumer goods. One third of China's total industrial output came from branches that draw materials from agriculture, while the rate was as high as four-fifths in the consumer goods industry (as of mid-1960).¹⁰

The second significant aspect of the current agrarian scene in China is the rapid consolidation of the rural communes. Consolidation takes place in various areas—the promotion of diverse economic undertakings, the training of more local agro-technicians, accountants, mess cooks, and nursery attendants, technical innovations, more effective utilization of rural manpower, and the

³ Liao Lu-yen, "The Whole Party and the Entire People Go in for Agriculture in A Big Way," *Peking Review*, September 14, 1960, p. 33.

⁴ Wang Kuan-wei, "How Industry Aids Agriculture," *Peking Review*, August 25, 1959, p. 6.

⁵ "Industry Supports Agriculture," *Peking Review*, August 9, 1960, p. 17.

⁶ Yang Po, "Continued Leap Forward in China's National Economy in 1960," *China Today*, September 30, 1960, pp. 16–17.

⁷ *China Today*, October 15, 1960, p. 8.

⁸ Wang Kuan-wei, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁹ Liao Lu-yen, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

¹⁰ "Importance of Agriculture for National Economy," *China Today*, September 10, 1960, p. 9.

expansion of sources for capital accumulation. The above were among the key programs at about 10 rural (including suburban) communes visited by the writer last summer. In 1959, there were 200,000 commune-run factories, producing a total value of some 20,000 million *yuan* in output. In 1958, the total accumulated by the communes was about 10,000 million *yuan*, and the estimated purchasing power in rural areas came to 30,000 million *yuan*, 20 per cent more than 1957.

According to incomplete data gathered from 17 provinces and municipalities, in 1958 the people's communes made or repaired over 100 million pieces of farm implements, manufactured 290,000 tons of cement, 2.4 million tons of native iron, 530,000 tons of locally-made steel, and 25.3 million tons of coal. The communes also generated a total of 36 million kilowatt-hours of electricity. The amount of agricultural (including subsidiary) products bought by the state in 1958 was 12.2 per cent more than the preceding year, and during the first six months of 1959, there was a further increase of 25 per cent compared to the same period of 1958. At the end of July, 1959, the total amount of savings in the countryside was 228 per cent more than a year ago.¹¹

With the aim of pooling greater manpower and putting it to more effective use, the communes have undertaken to promote numerous labor-intensive projects such as irrigation, conservation, afforestation, road building and more intensive farming. The reported acreages added by irrigation and afforestation during recent years in China are respectively as follows (in 1,000 acres): 1957, 10,880 and 7,180; 1958, 43,650 and 66,700; 1959, 46,600 and 11,660; and 1960 (goal), 33,300 and 10,000.¹²

Factory-Commune Hook-Up

During the writer's trip to China in mid-1960, a new organizational form, the factory-commune hook-up system, was being vigorously popularized to facilitate the development of industry and technology among the communes. There are three major forms of this arrangement: (1) A particular commune may be "hooked up" with a particular factory which helps the former by supplying certain needed equipment, skilled workers

and technical know-how; (2) A group of factories may be "linked" with one or several communes, thus expanding the scope of assistance; and (3) Communes and factories are "hooked up" on the basis of a municipality, a large area, or even an entire province.

While the first type represents the most common form, the second type is encouraged by the authorities as it provides more effective coordination of resources and needs. The third type, the most complex, is still in the experimental stage. In mid-1960, the majority of industrial and mining enterprises in the province of Liaoning, which had an early start in this system, have been "linked up" with some 460 rural communes. It was reported that partly due to this novel system, the output value of products from commune factories in Liaoning at the end of March, 1960, was 39 per cent higher than the same period a year ago.¹³ At the same time, about 9,000 commune members were trained to be technicians by the industrial enterprises in that province (between March, 1959, and March, (?) 1960).

In Shanghai, more than 1,000 factories had established links with 172 rural people's communes in 11 suburban counties on a one-to-one or several-plants-to-a-commune basis as of July, 1960. In Kiangsu province, some 7,600 factories were hooked-up with rural communes in the spring of 1960. Even in the remote area of Kweiyang (in the Southwest), all factories were grouped into 7 "coordination units," each embodying metallurgical, engineering, chemical, power and light industrial plants to accord systematic assistance to the 35 suburban communes also grouped into 7 divisions. In two months, these industrial enterprises had helped the communes to build and expand 30 farm tools plants, machine repair works, and chemical fertilizer plants; to repair and install 53 mechanical pumping stations; and to build and enlarge 29 power stations.¹⁴

¹¹ Ts'ai Mao, "The Superior Nature of People's Communes As Seen from Financial and Trade Work," *Ching-chi yen-chiu* (Economic Research), November 17, 1959, pp. 36-37.

¹² Data from Table VIII in author's *Agrarian Policy of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1959*, IPR, N.Y., p. 303.

¹³ Huang Ho-ching, "Commune-Factory Hook-Up Represents a New Form of Strengthening Worker-Peasant Alliance," *Hung-ch'i* (Red Flag), July 1, 1960, pp. 1-7.

¹⁴ "Industry Supports Agriculture," *Peking Review*, August 9, 1960, pp. 17-19.

While the communes are developing steadily, certain difficulties envisaged by some writers abroad have not materialized. For instance, Professor Shigeru Ishikawa, a renowned scholar on China's economic problems, wrote in September, 1960, that

I must admit that the doubt I had entertained has not been realized over the past two years, and that farmers' individualism, their sensitivity to incentives, and the possibilities of increasing diseconomies as the scale of production expands especially without a parallel addition to capital equipments—these were the basis of my doubt—have not played any important role in checking these developments (in fully utilizing rural labour power, in agro-technical improvements, in enhancing crop yields per acre, etc.).¹⁵

The third salient development in the current agrarian scene in China concerns the speeding up of mechanization and electrification in the Chinese countryside. Up to 1959, mechanized farming in China was still in the initial stage. There were, in that year, just 55,000 standard units (15 h.p.) of tractors, for instance. Only some 10 per cent of irrigation was mechanized; and the total mechanical power used for this purpose came to 2.8 million h.p. The generating capacity of rural power stations was about 250,000 k.w. The number of lorries engaged in rural transport was merely 13,000. Less than 30 kg. of chemical fertilizers were applied on the average to each hectare of farm. At the end of 1959, the proportion of mechanized farming on the Chinese mainland covered roughly 5 per cent of the total cultivated acreage.¹⁶

Farm Mechanization

Since 1959, an ambitious plan of farm mechanization has been initiated. In the first stage, covering 1959 to 1962, a "small-scale" solution of the problem is to be achieved. This means mechanizing agriculture on the outskirts of big cities, in the main grain-growing centers, and in the major industrial crop growing regions. For the rest of the countryside, the work centers on improving the traditional farm implements. During the second stage, 1963–1965, it is planned that mechanization will be completed over more than half of the rural areas. The entire countryside will be covered by the end of the third stage, that is,

by 1969. This scheme is expected to double both the per hectare yield and the yield per unit of rural labor.

At the moment, a key item in the program of mechanization consists of the popularization of rice transplanters. By May, 1960, some 2.4 million transplanters of different types were built and about 60 per cent of the transplanting in China's paddy fields had been accomplished with the help of such machines. The plan aims at several million more such implements by early 1961. Other machines including seeders, weeder, and new-type ploughs have also been popularized. It was reported that the newly added agricultural mechanical power up to September, 1960, was equivalent to nearly 20 million manpower.¹⁷

The current farm mechanization movement is assisted by the renovation of traditional agricultural tools, the setting up of more state farms, field work by agro-technicians from state institutes, exhibitions of modern implements, and training of local technical personnel. During 1958 and 1959, over 500 million improved farm implements were introduced such as ball-bearings attached to wheels or remodeled traditional tools. During the first quarter of 1960, in the Szechuan province alone, over 22,000 small farm machinery, chemical fertilizer, and insecticide factories were set up and nearly 100,000 skilled workers were trained in the rural communes with the help of modern industries and technical institutes.

There were, at the end of 1959, 86,000 commune-run agricultural implement factories and workshops in China. In addition, there were (in 1958) 28 modern state agricultural equipment plants, and the Loyang Tractor Factory with an annual productive capacity of 15,000 units went into operation in November, 1959.¹⁸ It has been estimated that one h.p. can generally perform the work of 8 manpower. The adoption of rice transplanters in the province of Kweichow alone saved about 2 million labor-days by June,

¹⁵ Shigeru Ishikawa, "Rural Communes—A Re-assessment," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 29, 1960, p. 722.

¹⁶ Li Ching-ming, "Ten Years to Mechanize Farming," *China Reconstructs*, January, 1960, p. 5.

¹⁷ Ch'en Yi, "Speech on the 11th Anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic," *China Today*, October 15, 1960, p. 9.

¹⁸ Li Ching-ming, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

1960.¹⁹ Another report stated that approximately half of the estimated shortage of 10,000 million workdays as a result of promotion of multiple economic activities in the rural areas in 1958 were made good by the enhanced efficiency of improved farm implements.²⁰

As mechanization in rural China progresses, a number of related questions need to be kept in mind: How will mechanization affect the farming system? What are the adjustments required in rural labor organization and labor utilization? What will be the related problems in management? In the need for more technical personnel? What types of agricultural endeavors still lack ready-made machinery and what kinds of machines do they need?²¹

Rural Electrification

Parallel to the promotion of mechanized farming, rural electrification also is being vigorously pushed. Up to the end of 1959, the generating capacity of power stations and local generating centers set up by the communes themselves reached 1.4 million k.w. During the first five months of 1960, the number of hydraulic-powered centers was 153,000 (including 3,000 hydraulic power stations), with a total capacity of 720,000 k.w. (120,000 k.w. from hydraulic power stations). In Honan province, 80 per cent of the 1,200 rural communes had established their own power stations. In building these small-scale power centers, local resources are fully utilized. According to the experience of certain communes, the cost of producing one k.w. of electricity by a hydraulic-powered center came to less than 200 *yuan* (or about \$85 U.S.), and by a hydraulic power station, less than 600 *yuan*. The time needed for construction varied between a fortnight and several months, depending on circumstances.²²

The stepped up tempo of modernizing China's farming methods is supported by a nation-wide network of agro-technical research and training programs. In addition to state agricultural institutes, between 70 and 80 per cent of the rural communes and the production brigades under them had set up research units by mid-1960. A new breed of enterprising, scientific-oriented peasantry has come into being in many rural districts

in China. In Shensi province alone, over two million peasants were drawn into the mass research work by the autumn of 1960.²³ A national soil survey involving 7 million peasants and soil technicians was carried out from 1958 to the end of 1959, covering 106.6 million hectares of farmland. The "8-Point Charter" for agriculture, namely, soil, fertilizer, water, seed, close-planting, pest protection, management, and tool, is widely applied throughout rural China. For example, some 36.66 million hectares of land were brought under irrigation during the two years of 1958 and 1959, the acreage sown with good seeds in 1959 increased to some 300 million acres, or approximately 80 per cent of the total crop area.²⁴

The fourth important feature in China's agriculture since 1958 is the development of diversified undertakings by the rural communes. The promotion of local industries in the rural areas has been discussed in previous sections. Concomitantly, activities in animal husbandry, fishery, subsidiary occupations, afforestation, vegetable-growing, local transportation, public hygiene, and education are being promoted in the communes.

With more comprehensive planning first by the agricultural producers' cooperatives and later (after 1958) by the communes, the output value from side line occupations, fisheries, animal husbandry and afforestation, has assumed an increasing proportion in the total value of agricultural products. One report showed that the value of the above-mentioned fields increased from 17 per cent in 1954 to 23 per cent in 1959 (in the total agricultural output value), while that of agriculture decreased from 83 per cent to 77 per cent in the same period.²⁵ This emphasis on multifarious undertakings, including also those in educational, medical, com-

¹⁹ "Mechanizing Rice Transplanting," *China Today*, September 3, 1960, p. 11.

²⁰ Ch'en Hung, "The Technical Transformation of Agriculture," *Peking Review*, March 1, 1960, p. 7.

²¹ Also see discussions by Tan Chen-lin, in his article "Speeding Up Mechanization of China's Agriculture," *Peking Review*, September 27, 1960, p. 10.

²² Liu Lan-po, "The Path to Realize Rural Electrification," *Hung-ch'i* (Red Flag), July 1, 1960, pp. 8-14.

²³ "People's Communes Study Ways to Increase Grain Production," *China Today*, September 3, 1960, p. 14.

²⁴ Ma Chu-chen, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

²⁵ Liu Jui-lung, "Current Tasks on the Agricultural Front," *Hung-ch'i* (Red Flag), January 2, 1960.

mercial and research fields, was evident in the development blueprints of about a dozen communes visited by this writer in the summer of 1960.

The fifth notable aspect in the current agricultural scene in China takes the form of certain organizational measures that play a substantial role in Chinese agrarian development. Space allows only a few examples. Many commune cadres are now adopting the "two to five schedule" for weekly work, which allots five days for most cadres to work with the production brigades (or in the fields) and two days to attend office affairs or meetings. (Commune male members get two days for holiday a month, and women members, three days.) This is designed to familiarize commune functionaries with the problems at the grass-roots and to enable them to give timely instructions. Another organizational form is "on-the-spot" conferences with delegates coming from various districts (or provinces) to meet where certain outstanding achievements have been made in agriculture and to discuss plans for disseminating and improving these "advanced experiences." These field conferences also serve to check and analyze reported accomplishments. Other organizational devices include the dispatching of urban cadres and students to work in the villages (from one month to a year), the regular visits of agronomists to work with experienced farmers in communes, and the enrolling of promising young peasants in special training classes at county, provincial, and national levels. Close coordination between economic and non-economic programs has been a traditional trait in the agrarian policy of the Peking government.

Current Problems

A few selective problems may be briefly discussed. The foremost one perhaps is the increasing complexity in managing (including the planning for) the expanding people's communes. The average membership of a rural commune comes to around 23,000 persons (some are as large as 100,000), and the management committee must take care of not only the multifarious economic activities (as mentioned previously) but also numerous tasks including civil administration, schools, public health and the militia. The require-

ments for competent section leaders, bookkeepers, mess cooks, and nurses in over one million production brigades and several millions of common dining halls, kindergartens and nurseries must be tremendous. Understandably the enthusiasm of many a commune member will be affected by the efficiency of this personnel. How to recruit and train personnel properly and quickly calls for the attention of the leadership of every commune.

A related problem concerns the possible development of contradictions in certain fields of agricultural planning between state requirements on one hand and regional or local schemes on the other. Thus differences may occur in plans for resource utilization, or the share of capital accumulation, or the disposition of available manpower. For instance, a particular commune may want to raise certain crops which yield a large income for the members but the state may assign priority to other crops that are needed more by the nation as a whole. Or there may be a conflict of interest between the commune's plan to employ a certain portion of its labor force for internal programs while the central government may require additional manpower from that commune to help build roads or railways. In theory, the local needs should subordinate themselves to the overall requirements of the nation. In practice, with increasing self-sufficiency of many communes, it may not always be possible for the state to make timely adjustments in resource allocations (including manpower) decided upon by the fast-growing communes.

Another obvious problem concerns the extensive natural calamities confronted by rural China in the past several years. The area affected by floods, drought, and other natural disasters on the Chinese mainland during 1948, 1959 and 1960 has been estimated as, respectively, 16.6 million acres, 83 million acres, and 100 million acres: the last figure exceeds one third of the total cultivated land of China.²⁶ These calamities occurred side by side with other developments that mitigated the adverse impact: 75 million acres (out of some 116.6 million acres) of swamps and low-yield lands were improved, and preliminary treatment was given 600 thousand

²⁶ *Jen-min jih-pao* (People's Daily), August 25, 1960, p. 1.

square kilometers (out of an estimated total of 1,500,000 square kilometers) of eroded land through soil conservation. In water conservation, about 91.6 million acres of land were brought under irrigation, bringing the irrigated acreage to 178 million, or over 60 per cent of the total cultivated land in China.²⁷ Nevertheless, the fact that vast regions were affected in the current years by natural disasters indicates that a great deal of effort still has to be exerted.

Other current problems in China's agricultural field are reflected by the existence of certain "weak spots" or bottlenecks. For example, the output of tea and silk cocoons in 1959 still lagged behind the peak level before 1949. The production as well as yield per hectare of several economic crops including peanuts, soybeans, and jute have progressed much slower than those of the major food crops and cotton. Also from first-hand observations, the supply of certain subsidiary foods like eggs, milk, some vegetables, edible oil, sugar, pork, and chicken in a number of leading cities in China in mid-1960 was insufficient. This partly reflects the need for a faster expansion of the livestock, and domestic fowl industry. The relatively slow rate of progress in China's livestock may be seen by the fact that the proportion of value of livestock in the total value of agricultural production in the Soviet Union increased from 38.6 per cent in 1929 to 60 per cent in 1956. The relative weight of livestock in the total value of agricultural output for several other countries may also be quoted to give a comparative picture: Czechoslovakia, 46.2 per cent (1957); France, 62.5 per cent (1956); Poland, 40.1 per cent (1957); and the United States, 54 per cent (1956).²⁸ The weight of livestock in the agricultural output value in China is not given (it is described by one Peking article as "quite low"), but obviously the tempo of growth in the Chinese livestock industry needs to be accelerated.

The period 1959-1960 witnessed many an impressive development in rural China, but also raised a number of problems. Because China was visited by the worst natural dis-

asters since the establishment of the Central People's Government on October 1, 1949, it is doubtful at the moment that the goal of a 10 per cent increase in food grain (to some 297 million tons) could be fulfilled. However, studying the agrarian development of China in the past decade, and taking into consideration the cumulative effect of many long-term programs such as conservation, afforestation, scientific research and training, technical innovations, multi-purpose planning measures by the communes, and a host of socio-educational endeavours, the potential for China's agricultural sector is tremendous.

No sector in the economy of a nation can be viewed in isolation, and agriculture in China is closely related to the over-all development of the nation—in both economic and non-economic fields. Peking statistics show that the gross value of industrial (including handicrafts) products for recent years has been increasing at the following pace (in billion U. S. dollars, with the value of agricultural output in brackets): 1952, 14.57 (20.55); 1957, 33.33 (25.62); 1958, 49.68 (28.50); 1959, 69.21 (33.25), and 1960 (goal), 89.17 (37.36).²⁹ A report by Vice-Premier Ch'en Yi on the eleventh anniversary of the People's Republic of China (October 1, 1960) stated that the rates of increase for the period January-August, 1960, for several major products as compared with the same period in 1959 were as follows: steel, 40 per cent; coal, 25 per cent; pig iron, 40 per cent; electricity power, 45 per cent, and the volume of freight by modern means of transport, 45 per cent.³⁰

This extraordinary pace of industrial growth, plus a steady progress in education and public health and a spirit of self-confidence and self-reliance that was very evident at all the places (including the rural communes) visited by the author, in May-July 1960, give no ground to doubt the long-term promising prospects for Chinese agriculture.

²⁷ Ma Chu-chen, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

²⁸ Yeh Nung, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

²⁹ Data compiled from *The Great Decade*, Peking, September, 1959; and Li Fu-ch'un, "Report on the Draft 1960 National Economic Plan," *Peking Review*, April 5, 1960, pp. 5-20.

³⁰ Ch'en Yi, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

Among the smallest political bodies in the world are Vatican City (890 inhabitants in 1948), Andorra (5,000), Monaco (22,000), Liechtenstein (14,000), San Marino (13,000), and Qatar (20,000).—Twentieth Century Fund Report.

Received at our Desk

COMMUNIST CHINA AND ASIA. By A. DOAK BARNETT. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Harper and Bros., 1960. 575 pages, bibliographic note and index, \$6.95.)

Neither American policy nor American public opinion has as yet realistically faced the growing challenge of Communist China. Historical and political (domestic) considerations so condition our thinking that the future of the United States in Asia seems uncomfortably bleak. This study "attempts to appraise the Chinese Communist challenge throughout Asia and to examine its political and economic as well as its military facets." It does this with clarity and objectivity.

The author is at his best in analyzing the dimensions of Peking's challenge. There are excellent, informative chapters on "Economic Development," "The Roots of Mao's Strategy," "Evolving Tactics in Foreign Policy," "Military Strength and the Balance of Power," "Communist Subversion and the Political Struggle," "The Overseas Chinese," and several on Chinese foreign relations. The facets of the Chinese Communist threat are effectively presented, as are the alternatives available to the United States. However, there is a let-down when the author comes to specific policy recommendations. He seems hampered by an excessive concern for "objectivity"; or perhaps he wishes to avoid the pitfalls which usually beset experts who flirt with prognostications.

The author notes that "for some years, the situation in Asia is likely to involve serious risks of war between the United States and Communist China," and that "American purposes in the region might be defeated by the outbreak of major war with Communist China, as well as by appeasement." But his proposals are too vague for policy guidance. For example, the "building of positions of real strength" sounds like a policy, but what does it mean

in practice? Despite the author's optimistic attitude, it seems also unlikely that the "two-China" idea will prove acceptable to Peking.

However, these comments are not meant to detract from a fine study. Dr. Barnett succeeds brilliantly in achieving his stated objectives. His presentation is balanced, well-organized, and superbly written.

A.Z.R.

TEN YEARS OF STORM. By CHOW CHING-WEN. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960. 323 pages and index, \$6.00.)

The author of this interesting, informative book was a leader of one of the minor parties in the coalition government established by the Chinese Communists after their takeover in 1949. Mr. Chow served in the government for eight years. The principal value of his account centers on his experiences during the 1949-1957 period, on the vignettes of the top leaders which he presents, and on the debasement of the intellectuals.

There are chapters on the Communist seizure of power, the technique of coalition government, the economic system, with particular attention given to the commune system, the cultural impact of communism in China, and the diplomacy of Peking. The three chapters dealing with "Struggles and Liquidations"—with the methods used by the Communists "to help the Government carry on its routine duties" (largely beneficial) and to eliminate opposition groups, "to create conflicts between people and isolate people to make them turn to and depend on the CCP for security and survival"—are particularly useful, for they show the extent to which the leadership is prepared to go to ensure its power and position.

The weakest sections of the book deal with China's foreign policy and with the

prospects for an overthrow of the Communist regime. They tend toward the polemical and the propagandistic. However, the biographical portraits of Mao Tse-tung and the key Communist leaders, and the accounts of experiences which personalize ruthless, often seemingly impersonal campaigns of terror, make this a valuable addition to our fragmentary knowledge of life in Communist China.

A.Z.R.

CHINA'S ENTRANCE INTO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS. BY IMMANUEL C. Y. Hsü. Foreword by William L. Langer. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. 255 pages, \$5.50.)

Seldom has a country resisted so tenaciously being drawn into the community of nations as did the Chinese Empire during the nineteenth century. Immanuel Hsü has described the diplomatic phase of this entry for the critical period from 1858 to 1880. Although giving due attention to the role of the Western powers (primarily the British) he has given major emphasis to the internal factors in the Chinese situation itself. This is an important contribution.

Chinese reluctance was in part traditional. There is nothing new in the idea that Chinese contacts with the rest of the world had been primarily with distinctly inferior peoples from the heart of Asia; and hence it was hardly surprising that China had concluded the rest of the world had nothing to offer. These contacts had, however, been maintained during some periods with great mutual benefit as Joseph Needham has recently been demonstrating in his monumental series.

The reluctance of the Manchu Dynasty to establish foreign contacts had to have additional causes, whether China was conscious of these or not. And cause enough there was. The Dynasty was entering its last half century of decline and decadence; two mammoth rebellions had sapped much of its vitality which public corruption would finish. However outwardly contemptuous the Imperial Court may have been of the western barbarians, it must have recognized that here was power and

vitality new in Chinese experience. Perhaps it was final evidence its days were numbered that, unlike Japan, it could not read the signs, adapt and adopt, and learn for its own ends.

JOHN F. MELBY
University of Pennsylvania

THE HUNDRED FLOWERS CAMPAIGN AND THE CHINESE INTELLECTUALS. BY RODERICK MACFARQUHAR. With an epilogue by G. F. HUDSON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. 324 pages, \$6.75.)

Among the more extraordinary periods in the first decade of the People's Republic of China is the few weeks in 1957 during which the articulate groups took seriously the exhortation of Chairman Mao Tse-tung to let one hundred flowers (and schools of thought) bloom and contend—and availed themselves so vigorously of the permission that the Government felt compelled to impose an even more rigid censorship than had previously existed.

Roderick MacFarquhar, editor of the excellent new British journal "The China Quarterly," has produced a much needed and very readable volume which is in the main a compilation of mainland Chinese newspaper reports on the incident. The reports are arranged by groups: press, scholars, doctors, students, writers and artists, businessmen, civil servants, democratic parties, peasants and workers, religious groups and national minorities. Each section is preceded by a summary and commentary; and the epilogue by G. F. Hudson relates the Chinese developments to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

There is still no good explanation as to what Mao thought he was doing, unless he had persuaded himself he had everyone under control. In any event, he was wrong. There was little response from the peasants and workers; they had never had or been interested in free expression anyway, and their standards of living were improving. The intellectuals and the professional people saw another story. That the older intellectuals were restless should have surprised no one; but Mao must have been disturbed by the students on

whom the regime had counted so heavily. There was little doubt many of them were unhappy. J.F.M.

SOVIET COEXISTENCE STRATEGY:

A Case Study of Experiences in the International Labor Organization. By ALFRED FERNBACH. (Wash., D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960. 63 pages, \$1.00.)

There are as yet few systematic studies of Soviet behavior in international organizations. This neglect is unfortunate because much useful information can be obtained from analyses of Soviet policies in these organizations. Mr. Fernbach's monograph is therefore a welcome addition to our slowly growing body of knowledge concerning specific Soviet policies.

In brief, informative chapters, the author traces the early Soviet attitude toward the I.L.O., the probable reasons behind the U.S.S.R.'s re-joining of the organization in 1954, the principal areas of Soviet interest, and the important controversies which have developed during the past six years. He notes that "the real Soviet interest in the I.L.O. seems to lie, first of all, in having the Communist bloc appear as the most reliable champion of the interests of the workers, and in promoting the class struggle."

Another Soviet objective, one to which the author does not devote sufficient attention, is "the use of the Organization to transmit propaganda on the economic and social achievements of the Communist countries, on their desire for peace, and on their interest in advancing the welfare of the peoples in underdeveloped countries, especially in Asia and Africa." It is important to know how successful the Soviets are in promoting a favorable image of the Soviet Union, within the I.L.O., among the underdeveloped countries. —A.Z.R.

NUSANTARA: A HISTORY OF INDONESIA. By BERNARD H. M. VLEKKE. Revised edition. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1960. 479 pages and index, \$10.00.)

More than eighty million people live on the 3,000 islands of Indonesia. Indo-

nesia, a mosaic of many languages, racial groups, and cultures, is bound by a common religion and by the ideals of nationalism. To understand its confused and complex contemporary condition, one must know the roots of its past.

Bernard H. M. Vlekke, a Netherlander by birth and nationality, and presently a Professor of International Relations at the University of Leyden, has revised his history of Indonesia, first published in 1943, and provided a solid addition to studies on this troubled country. He has completely reworked the first four chapters so that they now "reflect the latest research in the extremely difficult field of ancient Javanese literature and culture." He has also rearranged many sections, dealing with the period up to 1800, "So as to bring the history of Indonesian states and institutions to the fore."

The student of pre-1941 Indonesian history will find this an excellent work of scholarship. It is informative, well-organized, and remarkable for its balanced presentation. The author would make a valuable contribution to the teaching of international relations if he brought his work up to the present period.—A.Z.R.

FREE WORLD SECURITY. DISCUSSION AND DEBATE MANUAL, 1960-1961. EDITED BY BOWER ALY. (Columbia, Mo.: Artcraft Press Publisher, 1960. 420 pages, bibliography and index, \$4.50.)

This thirty-fourth Discussion and Debate Manual covers the problem area recommended for high school debate in 1960-1961: How Can the Security of the Free World Best Be Maintained? Original articles by such writers as Clarence Streit, Eric Johnston, James P. Warburg, Walter Reuther, and many others, offer a variety of viewpoints. In addition, a valuable selection of reprints rounds out the work. Specially prepared to meet the needs of debaters, the book deserves high commendation for the quality of its articles and for the wide range of opinions included.

Current Documents

U.N. MEMBERSHIP REFUSED COMMUNIST CHINA

On October 1, 1960, United States representative to the U. N. James J. Wadsworth and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev discussed in the General Assembly the question of Communist China's admission to the U.N. The General (Steering) Committee of the U.N. recommended a U.S.-sponsored resolution postponing discussion of the question, and the General Assembly voted 42 to 43 with 22 abstentions on October 8 to adopt the Committee recommendation. In effect, Communist China was again refused admission. Excerpts from the October 1 speeches given by Wadsworth and Khrushchev are reprinted here because they are representative of the conflicting views on the admission to the U.N. of Communist China.

James J. Wadsworth
(United States)

The General Assembly has before it a draft resolution recommended by the General Committee which reads as follows:

"The General Assembly

"1. Decides to reject the request of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the inclusion in the agenda of its fifteenth regular session of the item entitled 'Representation of China in the United Nations.'

"2. Decides not to consider, at its fifteenth regular session, any proposals to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China."

Now, the effect of the adoption of this resolution by the General Assembly will be that without further debate at this session the proposal to expel the Republic of China from this organization and to seat in its place the People's Republic of China will once again be rejected, as it has been rejected every year since 1951.

In the General Committee we stated briefly our reasons for our strong opposition to the Soviet proposal. Now, before the entire membership of this great body, I should like to set forth our reasoning in more detail.

Now let me recall for a moment the situation in which the United Nations finds itself at this point in history. For it cannot be denied that this Soviet proposal concerning

China, although it has been raised and rejected every year in the General Assembly for years past, has never been raised at a more historic and critical moment—a moment of greater promise and greater danger—than that which the United Nations faces today.

The issue which still must be decided by events is momentous: whether the people of the Congo—and, perhaps, of all Africa—shall enjoy the heritage of freedom and independence which has been awaiting them, and which is their birthright; or whether they shall be engulfed by a new kind of imperialism.

It is therefore pertinent to find out what attitude, if any, has been taken toward the United Nations operation in the Congo by the Chinese Communist authorities whom the Soviet Union now wishes us to seat in our midst.

We are not without evidence on this point. On September 12, the Mayor of Peking, Mr. Peng Chen, who is also a member of the ruling Politburo of the Chinese Communist party, which in turn is the supreme authority in Communist China, made a speech to a rally in Peking in which he said:

"The recent armed intervention of the United States imperialists in the Congo under the cover of the United Nations flag has disclosed most nakedly that United States imperialism is the most vicious enemy of the national independence movement in Africa."

Then two days later, the Government of

Peking issued an official Government statement about the situation in the Congo. I quoted this statement in the General Committee. It is full of such phrases as "the United Nations forces under the control of the United States." It contains a particularly offensive reference to "Hammarskjold, always at the beck and call of United States imperialism."

Reflecting on such statements, it takes only a little imagination to perceive that if Communist China had a seat in this organization today, they would make an all-out attempt to tear down everything that the United Nations is trying to do in the Congo and throughout Africa.

In Korea in the fall of 1950, when the United Nations forces had almost finished defeating the aggressor army of Communist North Korea, 1,000,000 Chinese Communist troops poured into Korea to renew the aggression. For this, in February, 1951, Communist China was condemned by a vote of the General Assembly which remains valid to this day. After two years of bitter war against the United Nations, an armistice was achieved. The Chinese Communists violated the armistice by callously refusing to account for thousands of prisoners of war in their hands—which they have never done to this day—and by illegally reinforcing their military forces in North Korea.

In the Taiwan Strait, Communist China has been using armed forces intermittently since 1950 as part of its violent campaign to seize Taiwan and the Pescadores and thus to destroy the Republic of China.

In Southeast Asia also, Communist China's record is one of aggressive pressure. They began in February, 1950, by calling on all the peoples of Southeast Asia to overthrow their governments. For many years they gave material support and propaganda encouragement to Communist guerrillas who were trying to overthrow the governments of the Philippines and Malaya. In North Vietnam, a Communist state which owes its existence in great measure to the Chinese Communists, they have helped the regime to enlarge its army greatly both in troop strength and in weapons—all in violation of the armistice terms applying to that area.

The outrages of Communist China in Tibet are well known.

In the past year the Chinese Communists have moved beyond Tibet and have made military incursions into the territory of the sovereign nations of South Asia. Prime Minister Nehru of India has described these incursions bluntly as "aggression." Official maps issued by Communist China show as Chinese large areas long regarded by other states as their territory.

On the mainland of China, uncivilized acts against nationals of other countries are standard practice.

Certainly no regime with the record which I have just described can be expected to pursue the purposes of the United Nations, nor can it be called "peace-loving."

This is proved once again by the Chinese Communist attack—from which I quoted a moment ago—against the United Nations effort to help bring peace and true independence to the Congo. No more eloquent proof could be offered that the Chinese Communists oppose the United Nations Charter and are contemptuous of those who devotedly serve it.

On April 16, 1960, there appeared in Peking an article of great significance in the magazine *Red Flag*. This is the official journal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party. And here is what it says about revolutions which overthrow non-Communist governments:

"Revolution means the use of revolutionary violence by the oppressed class, it means revolutionary war."

In fact, this same article does not even recoil from the thought of a world-wide war—a war fought with hydrogen bombs—not recoil there—if only that will promise the conquest of the world by communism. World opinion was quite skeptical when a number of prominent personalities began about two years ago to tell of conversations with Chinese Communist leaders, in which those leaders said that China could withstand a hydrogen war because even after losing some 300,000,000 people, they would still have 300,000,000 left and could then proceed to communize the world. Such a willingness to sacrifice hundreds of millions of Chinese in a single stroke seems too frightful to believe. But now, in their official journal, *Red Flag*, Chinese Communists say that they do not fear a hydrogen war because—

"... on the debris of a dead imperialism, the victorious people would create with extreme rapidity a civilization thousands of times higher than the capitalist system and a truly beautiful future for themselves."

This, I believe, is the only recorded instance of a group of men anywhere in the world believing that a world war fought with hydrogen bombs in which up to a half or more of their own huge population could be wiped out would lead to a beautiful future for anybody.

Now, before I conclude, let me deal briefly with certain arguments which are sometimes advanced on this subject.

First, we sometimes hear it said that Communist China is indeed guilty of gross violations of the Charter, but that admitting its representatives to the United Nations would tend to remedy its extreme behavior by exposing the regime to moderating ideas and influences.

Now, the Charter gives no basis for such an argument, since eligibility for admission depends on whether a state is peace-loving, not on whether it stands in need of reform. Even so, this argument might carry weight if there were any facts at all to support it. But there are none.

This regime that we are discussing has consistently demanded a seat in this body as a right, even while they were in the act of aggression against the United Nations. They have never shown any willingness to moderate their policies out of deference to the United Nations Charter or to the expressed views of this organization. They have continued to denounce the United Nations. They have made it clear that they would accept a seat only on their own terms, but to admit them on these terms, with no abatement of their present policies, would only reward them for their uncompromising attitude and thereby strengthen rather than weaken their addiction to aggression.

Then there is a second argument—that to exclude the Chinese Communists adds to the danger of war because, we are told, there is no place except in the United Nations in which to negotiate with them. Yet my own country has negotiated with them over the past eight years—at Panmunjom, in Geneva and in Warsaw. We have negotiated with them about Korea, about the prisoners whom

they unlawfully detained, and about the Taiwan Strait. The lack is not of a forum for negotiation, but of a willingness on the part of the Chinese Communist to settle any important question, except by capitulation to their own intransigent terms.

Finally, it is sometimes argued that refusal to seat the Peking regime in the United Nations denies representation in this world body to 600,000,000 mainland Chinese. In view of the long record of aggressions and threats of war by the Peking regime, this argument would have no validity under the Charter even if it were true. But the truth is that the rulers of Peking do not represent the Chinese people. The Peking regime was imposed by military force and in ten years it has carried out political purges which have brought death to some 18,000,000 Chinese.

Surely no government which represents its people has to resort to wholesale murder and mass slavery to keep itself in power.

It is tragically true that the mainland of China today is to a great extent isolated from the rest of the world. But it is not we who have isolated it. The Communist rulers of China have isolated themselves—and isolated some 600,000,000 Chinese people into the bargain—from the standpoint of world organization by a wall of fanatical hatred and violence against all those whom they cannot dominate.

Premier Khrushchev
(Soviet Union)

The delegation of the Soviet Union believes it necessary to submit for the consideration of the General Assembly the question of restoring the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.

China was one of the sponsors of the five principles of peaceful coexistence in 1954. The Government of the People's Republic of China repeatedly submitted proposals aimed at lessening international tension in the Far East, as well as in the whole world. The People's Republic of China made a large contribution to the peaceful settlement in Indochina, Korea and other areas of the Asian continent.

The Government of China actively favors the creation of a zone of peace in Asia as well

as a zone free from atomic weapons in the Pacific. It proposes a peaceful non-aggression treaty between all countries of Asia and the Pacific, including the United States.

The policy of the Government of China attests convincingly to the fact that it firmly adheres to the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and that it supports the main objectives and principles of the United Nations by its practical actions, that it exerts great efforts to widen international cooperation and to strengthen peace and friendship among nations.

For more than ten years the United Nations has been considering the question of the People's China taking its legitimate seat in the United Nations.

The arguments which the United States Government adduces against the People's China sound convincing only for those who follow in the footsteps of the American politicians who over ten years ago sustained a fiasco in China as a result of the fall of the mercenary Kuomintang regime and the victory of the Chinese People's (Revolution) Republic.

We insistently urge you, distinguished delegates, to break this vicious circle. There cannot, indeed, be any disarmament without China, there cannot be any normal work of the United Nations without China.

That is why the Soviet delegation proposes that the question of the restoration of China's legitimate rights in the United Nations be considered and resolved as an important and pressing question at the very outset of the work of the General Assembly session.

Fellow delegates, may I be permitted to answer the statement just made by the representative of the United States?

All the sparrows on the roof tops are crying about the fact that the most imperialist nation that is supporting the colonial regime in the colonies is the United States of America and he is indignant over that. What innocence, may I ask you, is being played here when it is known that this virtuous damsel has already got a dozen illegitimate children?

Mr. Hammarskjöld himself knows whose policy he has been carrying out better than Panjen [president of Peking City Council] himself because he is really the true servant

of monopolist capital and represents in the United Nations those countries which are conducting a brigand-like colonialist policy.

The representative of the United States of America says that the Chinese Peoples Republic is directing its efforts toward taking over the Pacific islands. Which islands? May I ask you and may I ask you, sir, the representative of the imperialism of the United States, if they wish to take over the island of Taiwan? And to whom does the island of Taiwan belong?

Look at the agreement or rather look at the capitulation which was signed in Tokyo and there you will find the signature of the representative of the American Government stating that the island of Taiwan belongs to the Chinese Republic. That is why China, naturally, wishes to take back what is its own. The other islands, which adjoin the continent of China, they also wish to take over.

I consider this to be most legitimate on the part of the Chinese Peoples Republic. We supported these endeavors on the part of the Chinese Peoples Republic. We shall support them and are supporting them now and I wish to state and I do state that the Chinese Government is demonstrating considerable reserve. But that is a matter for the Chinese people and the Chinese Government.

Here, the representative of the United States has spoken of the regime in China. The state system in China. He has come forward with a lot of distortions and fabrications about the situation in China, about the alleged repressions and all the other nonsense that the representative of the United States has been casting upon China. All this is a slander.

How long has the Soviet Union been the subject of slander and calumny? How much carping has there been about the Soviet Union? That there is no longer any democratic system in the Soviet Union? And yet there is no more democratic regime than a Socialist government.

- It is not for you to teach us. Sooner or later, you gentlemen of the United States will be obliged to learn how a government and state regime should be set up so that in each government there would be respect for the rights of every man. This is possible only under communism. This is possible only in the countries of Socialism.

I would advise the representative of the United States, before he speaks of regimes and systems, to look upon himself in the mirror and to see what sort of regime is, in fact, in existence in America. He has been appealing considerably to the countries of Africa. What love has he been expressing to the peoples who have just relieved themselves of colonial dependence and liberated themselves from it?

He is a fine gentleman. And I would ask him whether he thinks that if the representatives who have just come here from the African countries were to go without documents that they happen to be the representatives of their countries to the United Nations, would they even be allowed to take a room in a hotel?

These representatives cannot go to a restaurant assured of having a meal served to them there. They may have been told that this is a place for white people, but not for blacks. This is a humiliating offense, an insult to the dignity of every human, and this in white and black America is something that is commonplace. There is a distinct line drawn between the two. Is this democratic?

Another situation will be found in America. The blacks are being lynched, they are being hanged, and this is being considered to be law because he happens to be black. Is it for you then to speak of these matters, sir? The whole world is aware of this.

Read, sir, the literature. This is reflected in literature and the most important thing is, Mr. Representative of the United States, I would advise you to learn your history very thoroughly. We have the greatest respect for the memory of the American, Mr. Abraham Lincoln, who raised the banner of struggle against slavery and fought for the liberation of the blacks. And who was he? He was an American. And against whom did he fight? Against other Americans. But now this regime of discrimination against the blacks still exists in America.

The children of the blacks cannot go to the same schools as the children of the whites. Is that not a disgrace for a civilized government and state? And he is speaking of regimes, if you please, in the Socialist countries.

It might be somebody else's cow that might be doing the mooing on this occasion but not yours, surely. The Peking regime, according to him, is naughty and nasty.

I would tell the Government of the United States that they are close friends and consider the best regime in the world that which now exists in Franco Spain. And who is Franco, may I ask? Franco is the hangman of the Spanish people.

At this point, the President of the Assembly interrupted Mr. Khrushchev and said:

I would ask the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union to be good enough to lend his cooperation to the chair. The chair on a former occasion indicated a view of the chair that offensive remarks of a personal character directed to the heads of states or heads of governments were not in order. I am afraid a description which was applied to the head of a state by the speaker at the rostrum was unparliamentary and out of order and, being out of order, it should not appear in the official record. I would now ask the Chairman of the Council of Ministers to be good enough to continue his remarks.

Mr. Khrushchev continued:

I consider the statements to be completely out of order. Why did you then not stop the speaker who had been raising slander against the great people of China. It was the representative of the United States. It seems therefore that our rights are not equal. There is a double standard being applied here. And I reject that. In the United Nations there should be equal conditions. If there is an insult to these Socialist countries we shall not tolerate that and we shall reply in kind. We demand equal conditions. We are not here on suffrage but we represent our own great nation and our own great country and the Soviet Union and we are defending our friend, the Chinese People's Republic and her regime and her laws.

And then Syngman Rhee. Is he the greatest genius and also the greatest friend of the United States and the throttler and the choker of the Korean people? He has brought them to such a condition and such a pitch that he himself has run away on an American plane secretly and it is not known

where he is right now. And you may be sure that he is, of course, being supported by the United States.

And now I should like to adduce a further argument in answer to the arguments that were resorted to by the representative of the United States of America. You accused Peng Chen for having called America an imperialist government. That he has labeled Mr. Hammarskjold, the Secretary General—now, so far, I think that this injustice will be rectified—that he is at the beck and call of the imperialists. This is perfectly legitimate. If this argument of yours is really a serious argument then you should be logical and demand that we, the Soviet Union, be expelled from membership in the United Nations because this same statement was being made by me on behalf of my Government and I addressed that to America and to Mr. Hammarskjold. Then how can you tolerate one country in the United Nations and how is it that you don't admit another country which has said exactly the same thing and has said so quite appropriately and justifiably? Or else, gentlemen, I should like to adduce another argument too. It will be for you to decide.

You don't like the Socialist countries. You don't like Socialist China. But could we not put the question in the following way: What would happen to the United Nations if you were not to admit China? And if we were to go away from the United Nations? We, the Socialist countries. And if we were to organize our own United Nations with an appeal to those countries who want to take part and become members of our United Nations?

This will be the burying ground of the United Nations. This will be its tomb, because then there will be no longer the United Nations, but there will be blocs of states which will always war with each other. We do not wish to see that. We wish the United Nations to truly unite all countries, irrespec-

tive of the social and political systems in those countries, so that each state may have the opportunity of expressing its views.

But the United Nations must be supported in such a way that all the governments would be supported that want to become members of the United Nations and wish to apply with us their own efforts towards the guaranteeing and safeguarding of peace throughout the world.

That is why I say, gentlemen, that those who want peace on earth, those who want disarmament and those who want disarmament to be a guarantee of that peace, should vote in favor of the Chinese People's Republic assuming its rightful place among all those present here in the United Nations. And only under that condition can we hope that all the peoples will in fact be united within the United Nations, that they will all exert their efforts towards safeguarding peace and that the peace might be guaranteed.

What is being proposed by the representative of the United States is a proposal that has this old aggressive militarist imperialist policy, the pitting of one group of states against another; that is why they don't wish China to be a member of the United Nations.

But here, if this policy that is being carried out on this brink of war, if that policy is to slip from that edge and that brink, that will be a catastrophe for all the countries of the world because war will be a terrible one; war will be a rocket-nuclear war, and nobody can imagine this.

Do reflect upon it. Do make sure that this would not be tolerated, not be admitted, and in order to avoid that, we have to admit the Chinese People's Republic into the United Nations. Or rather not to admit them but to restore their rights. They have their rights.

We have to cast this corpse that we have here right out to hell and introduce a really living body, that of the Chinese People's Republic here; in its rightful place.

(Continued from page 349)

This tentative judgment, one hastens to add, is of course based on the assumptions that the iron grip of totalitarian control remains; that the Chinese population continues to be satisfied with its ideological fare instead of

effectively demanding greater material compensation; that there is no sudden unexpected drain on the nation's resources, such as war; and that no serious shortage of essential imports that cannot yet be replaced domestically takes place.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

African Conference

- Oct. 24—Eight African presidents and government ministers—all members of the French Community—meet at an African summit conference at Abidjan.
- Oct. 26—The African leaders at Abidjan agree to a common policy on Algeria, the Congo crisis, and Morocco's claims on Mauritania.

Arab Petroleum Congress

- Oct. 22—At the second Arab Petroleum Congress, Arab representatives criticize price reductions made by oil companies without their consent. They ask improved concessions as the Congress closes.

Berlin Crisis

- Oct. 7—Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev declares that he will not unilaterally sign a peace treaty with East Germany nor alter the status quo in Berlin if the Western powers guarantee that they will meet with him or arrange to meet with him after the U.S. presidential elections.
- Oct. 12—East Germany's foreign trade ministry confirms suspicions that it has withheld permits from Soviet bloc states wishing to ship goods to West Berlin via East Germany.
- Oct. 13—Trade talks between East and West Germany open in Bonn following West Germany's abrogation of the former trade pact. West Germany cancelled the trade pact because of East German restrictions on West Berliners' travels.
- Oct. 15—British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan says that the West and the Soviet Union will have to renew talks on the question of Berlin and Germany; he advocates summit talks on these issues.
- Oct. 22—It is disclosed that Premier Khrushchev set an April deadline for a Berlin summit talk in an interview with the West

Germany Ambassador to Moscow, Hans Kroll, on October 18. Otherwise, he will sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany.

Colombo Plan Conference

- Oct. 31—In Tokyo, the twelfth meeting of the Colombo Plan nations opens.

Disarmament

- Oct. 14—The U.S., Britain and Italy offer a draft resolution asking for resumption of the discussions for general and complete disarmament.
- Oct. 17—Britain, Russia and the U.S. agree on the legal framework of the control organization that would police a nuclear test ban treaty.
- Oct. 18—The Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly decides to place debate on disarmament and nuclear tests first on its agenda.
- Oct. 19—The U.S.S.R. warns it will boycott U.N. disarmament discussions if the political committee "wastes time" on futile Western suggestions.
- Oct. 24—Britain says that Soviet disarmament suggestions would "totally cripple" the West.
- Oct. 27—U.S. representative James J. Wadsworth says that total disarmament could be achieved within five or six years.

Nato

- Oct. 19—West German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss supports a proposal to turn Nato into the world's fourth atomic power.
- Oct. 27—West Germany suggests that General Adolf Heusinger should be made chairman of Nato's military committee in permanent session in Washington.

United Nations

- Oct. 1—Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev tells the General Assembly that there may

be a "terrible" atomic war unless Communist China is admitted to the U.N.

Oct. 2—Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru expresses strong support for the U.N.

Oct. 3—Khrushchev suggests that U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold resign; Hammarskjold refuses, affirming that he is the servant of the U.N.

Jordan's King Hussein tells the General Assembly that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser has lost authority in the Arab world.

Oct. 4—The Afro-Asian bloc opposes Portugal as a candidate for a Security Council seat.

Oct. 8—The General Assembly adopts a resolution postponing consideration of a changed representation for China in the U.N.; this effectively bars Red China from membership. (For text of this discussion, see pages 361 ff.)

Oct. 10—Guinea's President Sékou Touré introduces an enabling resolution providing for the provisional seating of Patrice Lumumba of the Congo in the General Assembly.

Nehru urges that Hammarskjold appoint a group of advisers to help him.

Oct. 11—Khrushchev's request that the General Assembly discuss disarmament instead of referring the problem to its political committee is turned down with a vote of 54 against his suggestion, 13 in favor and 31 abstaining.

Oct. 12—General Assembly President Frederick H. Boland adjourns a session early because of the disorder caused by Communist heckling.

Oct. 13—Premier Khrushchev leaves for Moscow.

Oct. 14—Hammarskjold asks for a 1961 budget of \$67.5 million.

Oct. 16—The U.N. receives a 15-power resolution sponsored by India and asking for renewed efforts to end world tensions.

Oct. 17—The General Assembly supports unanimously a resolution asking for "constructive steps" to minimize world tensions.

Hammarskjold says that the U.N. Congo program responds to the needs of the people of the Congo. (See also *Congo Republic*.)

Oct. 21—Czechoslovakia says that Soviet bloc nations will not share costs of the Congo operation because the U.N. has played a "dirty role" there.

20 members ask the U.N. to urge those administering territories under the U.N. to help train natives of the regions concerned.

Oct. 25—The U.S.S.R. suggests that the U.N. cut its budget drastically.

Oct. 27—The General Assembly approves a plan offering surplus food to needy peoples.

Hammarskjold urges Belgium to withdraw all its personnel from the Congo.

Oct. 31—Russia says it will block any effort to add to the Security Council or the Economic and Social Council until Communist China is admitted to the U.N.

West Europe's Trade (*Common Market and Outer Seven*)

Oct. 3—Britain's Deputy Secretary in charge of European Affairs arrives in Paris to discuss Atlantic community trade problems.

Oct. 12—The European Free Trade Association (*Outer Seven*) decides not to accelerate tariff reduction, to keep pace with the Common Market schedule.

Oct. 31—The Common Market Foreign Ministers consider admitting Greece as an associate of the Common Market community.

ARGENTINA

Oct. 12—General Carlos Toranzo Montero presents a list of grievances against the government appealing for a crackdown on Peronism and communism, and for administrative reorganization. In a radio broadcast, President Arturo Frondizi appeals for public support to stop an army coup. Later, Frondizi announces that he has refused to accept the resignation of Secretary of War Rodolfo Larcher.

Oct. 13—Ten prominent Argentine army officers resign to protest Frondizi's rejection of Larcher's resignation.

Oct. 14—Pressured by the army, President Frondizi appoints a new Secretary of War, Major General Rosendo A. Fraga. Larcher resigns.

Oct. 25—The U.S. announces financial aid for housing and highway projects to assist Argentine economic development.

AUSTRIA

- Oct. 22—Chancellor Julius Raab and his coalition Socialist-Conservative cabinet resign, because no agreement was reached on 1961 budget estimates as provided for in the Constitution.
- Oct. 28—Raab's resignation is accepted. He is asked to form a new government.

BRAZIL

- Oct. 3—Brazilians vote in presidential elections. Janio Quadros runs against the government-supported candidate, Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott.
- Oct. 6—Unofficial returns give a large margin of votes to independent candidate Janio da Silva Quadros, whose term will begin in January, 1961. Lott concedes the victory.
- Oct. 15—President Juscelino Kubitschek signs an executive order granting a 60 per cent rise in minimum salaries throughout the country.
- Oct. 17—It is announced that Joao Goulart has been elected vice-president.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, THE

Canada

- Oct. 8—A 2-day meeting between the provincial attorneys general and the Minister of Justice, E. Davie Fulton, ends in agreement that the problem of a new constitution for Canada needs further study.
- Oct. 11—Prime Minister John Diefenbaker reorganizes his Cabinet. Four new ministers are added; 10 ministries are reorganized.

Ghana

- Oct. 9—President Kwame Nkrumah denies reports that Ghana plans nationalization of foreign business concerns.
- Oct. 21—It is reported from Accra that the ministry of agriculture is organizing 30 state farms, to be operated as cooperatives.
- Oct. 22—Conina Kessie is named first Ghanaian ambassador to Communist China.

Great Britain

- Oct. 3—The fifty-ninth annual conference of the Labor party opens.
- Oct. 5—The Labor party votes support for unilateral disarmament and British neutrality, disregarding Labor leader Hugh Gaitskell.

- Oct. 20—Harold Wilson reveals that he will challenge Gaitskell's leadership of the Labor party.

The price of gold climbs to \$40.60 a fine ounce, as the "gold rush" continues; the price drops \$2.80 before the day ends.

- Oct. 21—Britain's first nuclear-powered submarine is launched.

- Oct. 24—The Foreign Office confirms an agreement between Britain and the U.A.R. to exchange ambassadors.

It is reported in London that the nuclear bombers of the R.A.F. are to be dispersed around the world to avoid surprise attack.

- Oct. 27—The U.S. Treasury states that it "has no criticism" of the Bank of England's gold policy.

The government cuts the bank rate from 6 per cent to 5.5 per cent.

- Oct. 29—Minister of Aviation Peter Thorneycroft returns from France after a three-day discussion of a joint British-West Europe project for orbiting a heavy satellite.

- Oct. 31—It is revealed in London that the Archbishop of Canterbury will visit Pope John XXIII in the Vatican in early December.

India

- Oct. 11—The Department of Atomic Energy announces that India is looking for foreign bids for construction of her first atomic power plant.

- Oct. 15—An Indian administrator replaces Portuguese Antonio Furtado in governing Portugal's former enclaves of Dadra and Nagar Aveli in India. Eventually India will absorb the enclaves, following a decision by the International Court of Justice (World Court).

- Oct. 24—The Government announces that Indian newspaper prices are to be controlled by the government beginning December 12.

- Oct. 30—The National Executive Board of the Socialist party accepts the resignation of Acharya J. B. Kripalani, a foremost parliamentary opposition spokesman.

Malaya

- Oct. 19—Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman arrives in Ottawa for a 3-day visit.

Oct. 25—Britain gives Malaya an \$8.4 million Royal Air Force base as a free gift.

Tengku Abdul Rahman arrives in Washington.

Oct. 26—Tengku Abdul Rahman asks U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter for U.S. "moral support" of his proposed settlement of the Netherlands-Indonesian disagreement over West New Guinea. Indonesia demands authority over Irian.

Oct. 27—The Malayan Prime Minister asks the U.S. to call together "all friendly nations" to discuss the admission of Communist China to the U.N.

Nigeria

Oct. 1—Nigeria becomes independent and joins the British Commonwealth.

Oct. 3—In a speech from the Throne, the administration promises to try to raise living standards throughout West Africa "by fostering such cultural and economic links as already exist."

Oct. 4—Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa leaves for the U.N.

Oct. 7—The U.N. General Assembly unanimously admits Nigeria as the U.N.'s ninety-ninth member.

Oct. 25—Nigeria has become the thirty-eighth member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt), it is announced, and has joined the International Labor Organization also.

Pakistan

Oct. 7—President Mohammad Ayub Khan says that the Kashmir dispute with India cannot remain "unsettled for long."

The official Afghan news agency reports fighting between Afghan and Pakistani troops on the border.

Oct. 19—It is reported from Dacca that some 5,000 persons died in a storm and tidal wave on October 10.

Union of South Africa

Oct. 6—Final returns in yesterday's election support the establishment of a republic, with a majority of over 72 thousand votes favoring the plan of Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd and his Nationalist party.

Oct. 14—South African Foreign Minister Eric Louw warns the U.N. General As-

sembly that there is Communist penetration in Africa.

BRITISH EMPIRE, THE

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Oct. 11—The Monckton Commission, the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, issues a 175-page report urging greater African representation in the federal assembly and the right of eventual secession for the three members of the Federation.

Oct. 23—Police in Salisbury reveal that some 478 persons have been arrested in a 2-day investigation under new emergency authority.

Kenya

Oct. 7—A convention of all the white settlers associations votes 38 to 4 to support Sir Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck's coalition in the 1961 general election.

CAMBODIA

Oct. 8—Prince Norodom Sihanouk announces that he will resign as chief of state.

CHINA (Nationalist)

Oct. 3—Lei Chen, newspaper publisher and leader of opposition to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, is tried before a military court on charges of sedition.

Oct. 8—Lei is sentenced by a military court and given a 7-year jail term for sedition and another 7 years for having abetted a Communist agent. The Court rules that he will only have to serve a maximum 10-year prison term. Two associates on Lei's publication, *Free China* magazine, are also given prison terms following conviction on charges of sedition.

CHINA (People's Republic)

Oct. 1—Communist China celebrates the eleventh anniversary of Communist rule. No Soviet delegation is present.

Oct. 8—It is reported that last night the Communist Chinese heavily shelled the Quemoy Islands.

Oct. 21—*Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, economic journal of the Soviet Communist party's Central Committee, in a survey

made public today, reports that the Soviet Union is giving 3 times more industrial aid to Red China than to any other Communist bloc country.

Oct. 22—Replying to a Soviet telegram congratulating Red China on the eleventh anniversary of its regime, the 4 leading Chinese Communist officials (Communist party chairman Mao Tse-tung, head of state Liu Shao-chi, Marshal Chu Teh and Premier Chou En-lai) affirm the unity of the Chinese-Soviet alliance.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Oct. 1—Albert Kalonji, head of secessionist South Kasai, in Mining State province, declares that he has the support of Congolese leadership for re-organizing the republic into a confederation.

Oct. 4—A U.N. \$500,000 program to help relieve unemployment in the Congo is begun.

Oct. 7—The College of High Commissioners, the caretaker government created by Colonel Joseph D. Mobutu (who took military control of the Congo when Premier Patrice Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu failed to work together to set up a government) establishes a National Monetary Board with jurisdiction over fiscal policy.

Mobutu arrests 12 pro-Lumumba supporters after Lumumba names a new cabinet in an effort to regain his authority.

Oct. 9—Jerome Bennetar, who organized Lumumba's Congolese National Movement party, disavows the ex-Premier and his leaning to the Soviet camp.

Oct. 11—The U.N. rejects the Congo's bid to arrest Lumumba. The Congo army issues a new appeal to U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld to hand over Lumumba, or face a military attack.

Oct. 13—Colonel Mobutu declares that he will not war with the U.N.

Oct. 14—One of the governing High Commissioners, Albert Ndele, is attacked by Lumumba followers.

Oct. 16—Colonel Mobutu and President Moise Tshombe of secessionist Katanga Province meet in Elizabethville where "agreeable" talks are held.

Oct. 17—Mobutu announces that Tshombe has given full support to his regime.

Oct. 20—President Cleophas Kamitatu of Leopoldville Province threatens to secede from the Congo unless the Congo government stops tribal and arbitrary violence within the army. He gives Mobutu 48 hours to restore discipline among Congo army forces.

Oct. 22—Colonel Mobutu announces that he will travel to New York and to Western nations to gain support for his anti-Communist government. He places Lieutenant Colonel Boboso in charge. Colonel Mobutu has been unable to persuade U.N. special representative in the Congo Rajeshwar Dayal to recognize officially the High Commission and Mobutu's deposition of Premier Lumumba.

Oct. 23—Rioting Congolese soldiers in Leopoldville take control over the African section of the city after clashes with civilians. The soldiers are reported to be drunk, half-crazed, and attacking civilian crowds. Mobutu leaves on an "inspection tour" to Coquilhatville, where similar violence is anticipated.

Oct. 24—Mobutu announces that he has cancelled his trip abroad.

U.N. day is celebrated in Leopoldville. Congolese army soldiers set up roadblocks and prevent many Europeans and Africans from attending ceremonies.

Oct. 25—It is announced that President Kasavubu has signed a decree legalizing Mobutu's military regime. The Congo government asks the U.N. to recognize the Mobutu government as the legal governing body.

Oct. 26—Colonel Mobutu and Chief of the High Commission Justin Bomboko agree to the U.N. demand that Congolese soldiers be taken off Leopoldville's streets and confined to barracks. The U.N. says that it will take greater responsibility for maintaining order.

Oct. 27—U.N. officials in the Congo announce that Mobutu is now fully cooperating with the U.N.

Oct. 29—Reliable sources report that U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld and the 18 nations which have supplied troops in the Congo have established a 15-nation Asian-African commission to try to end the Congo's internal disorder.

CUBA

- Oct. 6—It is announced that 27 men have made an invasion landing in Oriente Province. It is reported that 2 of the landing force have been captured.
- Oct. 8—The U.S. State Department announces that it has protested a Cuban Air Force plane's buzzing of a U.S. submarine in international waters 60 miles from Cuba. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)
- Oct. 9—An armed revolt in central Cuba's Las Villas province is quelled, according to a government announcement.
- Oct. 12—It is announced that 7 Cubans and 1 American have been sentenced to death by a revolutionary tribunal for staging an invasion of Cuba earlier in the month.
- Oct. 13—The 1 American and 7 Cubans are executed by a firing squad.
- Oct. 14—The Cuban cabinet authorizes the nationalization of all Cuban banks and all large industrial, commercial and transportation operations, including 20 U.S. owned companies. Some 400 private companies are confiscated by the government. 105 sugar mills are nationalized, thus giving the government full control over all of the island's 161 mills.
- Oct. 15—An urban reform law is approved under which tenants are made owners of their rented residences. However, the new tenant-owners must continue to pay their rent plus the property taxes to the government. The dispossessed owners will receive monthly indemnities for life. Mortgage holders will receive 50 per cent of rent payments; the other 50 per cent goes to the government. All mortgage interest is cancelled.
- Oct. 14—Teresa Casuso, a member of Cuba's permanent mission to the U.N., announces that she is defecting to the U.S.
- Oct. 18—In the U.N., Cuba asks the General Assembly to take up the question of U.S. aerial violations of Cuba. Foreign Minister Raul Roa charges that a U.S. plane dropped military supplies over Las Villas province.
- Oct. 19—The U.S. places an embargo on exported goods to Cuba, with the exception of medical supplies and most foodstuffs.
- Oct. 21—Ex-U.S. citizen and now Cuban army Major William A. Morgan is ar-

rested because of "counter-revolutionary activities."

- Oct. 25—The Cuban government nationalizes some 166 U.S. companies in Cuba, thus liquidating all major U.S. investments in Cuba.
- Oct. 28—The U.S. asks the O.A.S. 6-man committee on U.S.-Cuban affairs to investigate charges that Cuba is receiving large shipments of arms from the U.S.S.R.
- Oct. 29—The full text of Khrushchev's pledge of rocket protection for Cuba is published. It is learned that the premier declared that Soviet rocketry can "adequately" defend Cuba.
- Oct. 30—Cuba militia are stationed throughout Havana, reportedly to offset the 1,450 U.S. Marines on weekend liberty at the U.S. Guantanamo base.

CYPRUS

- Oct. 27—President of Cyprus Makarios tells a news conference he opposes using British bases on Cyprus for stockpiling nuclear weapons.
- Oct. 28—Antis Soteriades, former guerrilla leader, arrives in London as the first diplomatic representative to Britain. If Cyprus joins the Commonwealth, he will be known as high commissioner; otherwise he will be ambassador.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Oct. 24—Czechoslovakia grants Iraq a \$33 million loan credit, it is announced, under an economic and technical pact signed last night.

FRANCE

- Oct. 3—Speaking to an audience in Algeria, Premier Michel Debré calls the U.N. a hypocritical organization because leaders who have enslaved their own peoples are urging the U.N. to hold a referendum for Algerian self-determination. (See also *Algeria*.)
- Oct. 6—The French discount rate is lowered to 3.5 per cent from 4 per cent. Credit payment terms are also liberalized.
- Oct. 7—President Charles de Gaulle declares that he is seeking a French veto over the use of nuclear bombs by the Western powers.

- Oct. 8—Premier Michel Debré returns to Paris from Bonn after meeting with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who warns that the Atlantic alliance will be destroyed by lack of French support.
- Oct. 10—It is disclosed that France and Germany have agreed to call for talks by the 6 European heads of state.
- Oct. 12—Because of pressure from the French Riviera region, the government announces that it has postponed temporarily its plan to dump 6,500 barrels of radioactive waste materials 50 miles out in the Mediterranean.
- Oct. 13—Premier Debré tells Parliament that France's development of an independent nuclear deterrent will not affect French participation in a unified Western defense alliance.
- Oct. 20—67 members of Parliament sign a motion of censure protesting de Gaulle's program to develop an independent French nuclear force.
- Oct. 25—The motion of censure is not approved by the National Assembly.
France and West Germany sign an accord whereby France declares its willingness to allow West German soldiers to train at French bases. West German forces are growing so rapidly that West Germany is pressed for space.
- Oct. 26—German troops enter France for training maneuvers at French camps.

FRANCE OVERSEAS

Algeria

- Oct. 1—It is reported that Algerian nationalists have been seeking support from the neutral bloc at the U.N. for their proposal for a U.N. referendum on Algerian self-determination.
- Oct. 5—In the monthly publication of the National Education Federation, 67 teachers, teachers' union officials, writers and journalists publish an appeal urging that France negotiate an Algerian peace.
- Oct. 6—Premier Ferhat Abbas of the Algerian provisional government in exile arrives in Moscow to confer with Soviet officials.
- Oct. 16—*Trud* (trade union paper in the U.S.S.R.) discloses that 120 Algerians will be invited to the Soviet Union to re-

ceive technical training in Russian factories.

- Oct. 17—The Roman Catholic Church in France releases a declaration following a church assembly last week, in which de Gaulle's Algerian program is endorsed. The declaration also states that no French soldier may refuse to serve in Algeria.
- Oct. 19—Jacques Soustelle, who helped de Gaulle rise to power, calls for a "national regroupment" to oppose de Gaulle's policies; he urges a movement to work for a "French Algeria."
- Oct. 20—The government bans Paris rallies scheduled for October 27 to gain support for a negotiated Algerian peace; the rallies were called by students and workers.
- Oct. 23—In an interview in Tunis, Premier Abbas terms the West "colonialist" and states that the Algerian nationalists look to their "Chinese and Soviet friends" for the support they need.
- Oct. 24—Algerian nationalists attack 5 police stations on Paris' Left Bank. Seven policemen and 2 Algerians are killed during clashes. The police stations attacked are served by Algerian Muslims who are employed to infiltrate nationalist groups.
- Oct. 27—Left Bank rioting among police, Leftists and Rightists flares. 485 persons are arrested.
- Oct. 31—Abbas makes a speech indicating that the Algerian rebel government is not hopeful of negotiating a peace with France.

FRENCH OVERSEAS COMMUNITY, THE Malagasy Republic

- Oct. 4—It is announced that the Social Democratic party of President Philibert Tsiranana took 31 of the 36 contested seats, in Senate elections 2 days ago. The remaining 18 senatorial positions are appointed by the president.
- Oct. 26—Tsiranana arrives in Paris for a 3-day state visit.

Mali

- Oct. 27—It is announced that Red China and Mali have agreed to exchange ambassadors.

Mauritania

- Oct. 19—Mauritania, formerly an autonomous republic, becomes a fully sovereign state within the French Community.

Togo

Oct. 21—Togo Premier Sylvanus Olympio accuses Ghana of limiting Ghana trade with Togo because Togo has rejected the possibility of political union with Ghana.

GERMANY (WEST)

Oct. 21—Soviet ambassador to West Germany Andrei A. Smirnov shouts and interrupts a speech by Minister of the Economy Ludwig Erhard when Erhard denounces communism. Smirnov is escorted from the hall.

Oct. 29—Alfred Frenzel, a Social Democratic deputy in the Bundestag, is arrested and charged with treason for giving Czech Communists secret defense information.

GUINEA

Oct. 30—Guinea and the U.S. sign an agreement for U.S. technical and economic assistance.

INDONESIA

Oct. 5—It is reported that the U.S. will increase its military aid to Indonesia. It is believed that the U.S. assured Indonesian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Abdul Haris Nasution of increased aid during his visit last week to Washington.

IRAN

Oct. 7—The directors of the International Monetary Fund approve Iran's austerity program to balance its economy. The I.M.F. and the U.S. had insisted on such a program before making further loans to Iran.

Oct. 31—Queen Farah Diba gives birth to a son, who will be heir to Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi's throne.

ISRAEL

Oct. 10—Foreign Minister Golda Meir, in a speech before the U.N., urges Arab leaders to meet with Israeli officials to negotiate a peace.

JAPAN

Oct. 12—Inejiro Asanuma, Socialist party leader who opposed the Japanese-U.S. security pact and advocated closer ties with Communist states, is stabbed by an 18-year old college student.

Oct. 15—Thousands of persons march in mourning over the death of Asanuma. Unionist and student demonstrators call for the resignation of the pro-U.S. government of Premier Hayato Ikeda.

Oct. 24—Premier Ikeda dissolves the Diet and schedules new elections to the House of Representatives for November 20.

Oct. 27—The program for the voluntary repatriation of North Koreans to their homeland is extended for one year.

LAOS

Oct. 1—The army announces that remaining rebel strongholds in Samneua province have surrendered.

The Neo Lao Haksat party, the political branch of the pro-Communist rebel Pathet Lao forces, in a radio broadcast, declares that it is willing to talk peace terms with the government of Prince Souvanna Phouma.

Oct. 5—The government appoints a 4-man committee to hold peace talks with the Pathet Lao.

Oct. 7—Premier Phouma states that U.S. aid to Laos has been cut off. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

The U.S. State Department Press Officer, Francis W. Tully, Jr., confirms that the U.S. has withheld military aid payments to Laos.

Oct. 12—U. S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, J. Graham Parsons, arrives in Laos to discuss the three-way civil war between neutralists, pro-Communists and pro-Western elements.

Oct. 18—Captain Kong Le, who staged the August 9 coup to overthrow Laos' pro-Western government, is placed under a 15-day technical arrest for giving a reception for the first Soviet ambassador to Laos.

Oct. 21—The U.S. embassy in Vientiane announces that military funds to pay Laotian troops have been re-authorized after earlier suspension.

Oct. 26—It is reported that rebel Pathet Lao forces and Royal Laotian troops have resumed fighting in Phongsaly province.

Oct. 28—Phouma announces that U.S. military funds to pay the Laotian army have been resumed.

LIBYA

- Oct. 16—The resignation of Premier Abdel Majid Kuabar is accepted following a no-confidence parliamentary vote last week.
- Oct. 17—Mohammed ben Othman forms a new cabinet at the request of King Idris.

MOROCCO

- Oct. 15—The French consulate general and chancellery in Morocco are closed by the Moroccan government because of border violations by French troops in Algeria in pursuit of Algerian rebels.

NEPAL

- Oct. 9—The Chinese-Nepalese border commission, it is reported, has decided to set up joint teams to map out the disputed Nepalese-Chinese border.

PERU

- Oct. 8—Peruvian Acting Foreign Minister Luis Alvarado Garrido asks the 4 states that are responsible for the Peru-Ecuador border settlement to consider Ecuador's recent statement that the agreement is null and void.
- Oct. 16—Luis Alvarado Garrido is named Foreign Minister, succeeding the deceased Raul Porras Barrenechea.

POLAND

- Oct. 12—It is revealed that *Nowe Drogi*, a Communist publication, has published in its current issue a report of the Warsaw Committee of the Communist party on education at a meeting last June. The report states that compulsory lectures in Communist ideology will be resumed in Polish universities. This practice was discontinued in 1956.
- Oct. 13—First Secretary of the Communist party Wladyslaw Gomulka returns to Warsaw from New York. He announces that the U.S. will reinstate the most favored nation clause to apply to Polish trade with the U.S.

SALVADOR, EL

- Oct. 26—A 6-man junta, composed of 3 military leaders and 3 civilians, takes control in a bloodless coup. A state of siege has been in effect since September 5. The

ruling junta announces that it has overthrown President Jose Maria Lemus' government because it was tyrannical. The junta is headed by Colonel Cesar Yanes Urias.

- Oct. 27—The junta ends the state of siege. Ex-President Lemus arrives in Costa Rica.

TUNISIA

- Oct. 10—French and Tunisian representatives reach an agreement whereby Tunisia will be given 250,000 acres of farmland held by French settlers. Tunisia will pay 1 million dinars (\$2.238 million) for the land.

TURKEY

- Oct. 14—Trial of former Premier Adnan Menderes, former President Celal Bayar and 36 other ex-government leaders of the Democratic party begins. A military-civilian court hears the case.
- Oct. 17—It is reported that 22,500 Turkish reserve officers will be called to serve as teachers to help wipe out Turkey's 60 per cent illiteracy rate.

U.S.S.R.

- Oct. 9—In a television broadcast in the U.S., Premier Khrushchev says that the Soviet Union does not want war and that he will meet at a summit talk with the newly elected U.S. president.
- Oct. 10—The U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany in a joint statement just released demand a peace treaty be signed with two Germanies.
- Oct. 12—A Soviet sailor on the *Baltika* who defected to the U.S. 2 days ago confronts Soviet officials at the U.S. immigration offices in New York. The Soviet officials are unable to persuade the defector to return.
- Oct. 14—Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev arrives in Moscow after a 25-day trip to the United Nations.

The Soviet Union releases 2 American tourists and expels them from the U.S.S.R. The 2 tourists had been held several weeks while the U.S.S.R. denied knowledge of their whereabouts.

- Oct. 20—Soviet Premier Khrushchev announces that the U.S.S.R. now has nuclear

submarines capable of firing nuclear rockets.

Oct. 21—The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, according to an announcement by Tass (Soviet news agency), has approved the Antarctica pact.

Oct. 23—It is reported that the U.S.S.R. is matching the U.S. in steel production; in September the U.S.S.R. produced 6,100,000 tons, the U.S., 6,439,000.

Oct. 25—It is announced that Marshal Mitrofan I. Nedelin, head of the Soviet Rocket Command, was killed in a plane crash yesterday.

Oct. 28—The Soviet Union terms "dirty political provocation" the arrest of a Soviet official to the U.N., Igor Y. Melekh, by the U.S. The U.S. arrested Melekh and an accomplice, Willie Hirsch, yesterday and charged them with spy activities.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Oct. 5.—President Gamal Abdel Nasser arrives in Cairo after attending the U.N. General Assembly.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

Oct. 18—The Department of Agriculture reports that the Government has spent some \$10,120,383,000 on farm price supports from 1933 until August 31, 1960.

Civil Rights

Oct. 4—The President's Committee on Government Employment Policy reports that Negroes employed by the federal government in upper grade posts in five big cities have nearly doubled in number in four years.

Oct. 19—Fifty-one demonstrators are arrested in Atlanta for sit-down protests; 14 Negroes including the Reverend Martin Luther King are jailed after they refuse to post bonds.

Oct. 20—In Atlanta, 23 more sit-down demonstrators are arrested.

Oct. 25—The Reverend Martin Luther King is given a 4-month prison sentence because his sit-in demonstration participation violates the terms of a suspended sentence for a traffic violation.

Oct. 27—King is released on \$2,000 bond.

Economy

Oct. 20—Free market gold prices rise in all European centers; in London the price rises to \$40.60 an ounce. The official U.S. price has been \$35 an ounce since 1934.

Oct. 21—The price of gold on the London market falls to \$36.40 an ounce.

Oct. 26—The Federal Reserve Board liberalizes its requirements for funds that banks must hold in reserve, thus freeing funds to meet Christmas demands for cash and credit.

Oct. 31—Chairman of the Board of General Motors Frederic Donner reveals that General Motors plans a record expenditure of \$1.2 billion in 1961.

Foreign Policy

Oct. 2—President Eisenhower refuses to meet Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev at this time, despite the urging of five neutralist leaders.

Khrushchev's "strident and bellicose" statements are criticized by Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon.

Oct. 6—President Eisenhower meets with Indonesian President Sukarno.

Oct. 11—President Eisenhower entertains Denmark's King Frederik IX and Queen Ingrid.

Oct. 12—Italy's Foreign Minister, Antonio Segni, confers with President Eisenhower in Washington on French suggestions for Nato reorganization.

Oct. 15—The White House affirms the fact that the President and Vice-President are agreed on the policy of defending Matsu and Quemoy.

Oct. 17—President Eisenhower asks all free countries to increase aid to the underdeveloped nations.

The State Department reports that military aid to Laos is continuing after a brief suspension. (See also *Laos*.)

Oct. 18—Eisenhower asks Americans to "struggle ceaselessly for the success of the United Nations."

Oct. 19—The President approves plans for United States-Canadian development of the Columbia River Basin. It is reported that Eisenhower will ask for Senate ratification before he retires.

Oct. 20—The State Department reveals that the U.S. Ambassador to Cuba, Philip Bonsal, has been recalled to Washington for a long period of consultation. (See also *Cuba*.)

Oct. 24—A State Department spokesman says that the U.S. does not regard the Oder-Neisse line between Germany and Poland as a permanent boundary.

Oct. 25—British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan reveals the completion of a "satisfactory" revision of the agreement allowing the U.S. Air Force to use British air bases.

Oct. 26—It is reported from Washington that the Administration is prepared to use force to defend the Guantanamo Naval Base against Cuba, if Castro should abrogate the treaty assuring the U.S. that it can maintain the base.

Oct. 27—The Federal Bureau of Investigation arrests a Russian employee of the U.N. and a German freelance artist on espionage charges. (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Government

Oct. 4—The Bureau of the Budget reveals a revised estimate showing a surplus for fiscal 1961 of \$1.1 billion instead of \$4.2 billion. The reduction is due to lower corporate profits in the first part of the fiscal year.

Oct. 12—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration offers to launch communications satellites developed by private industry at cost.

Oct. 13—Attorney General William P. Rogers says that some \$37 million in "windfall profits" on post-war housing has been recovered by the government.

Oct. 14—President Eisenhower celebrates his seventieth birthday. He is the first president to reach this age during his office.

Oct. 21—Three Puerto Rican bishops forbid Catholics to vote for the Popular Democratic party of Governor Luis Munoz Marin.

Oct. 27—The President sets immigration quotas at 100 persons a year from each of three new states of Africa: Nigeria, the Republic of Mali and the Republic of Senegal.

Oct. 28—In Puerto Rico, the Chancellor of

the Ponce Diocese warns that those who vote for political parties out of favor with the Roman Catholic Church can be excommunicated.

Labor

Oct. 1—Negotiations fail between the General Electric Company and the International Union of Electric Workers.

Oct. 2—Seventy thousand electrical workers strike against the General Electric company.

Oct. 3—Labor Secretary James P. Mitchell files a suit under the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 charging that the election of Joseph Curran and 74 other officials of the National Maritime Union did not comply with provisions of the act.

Oct. 6—G.E.'s Schenectady plant is closed by a mass picket line.

Oct. 18—Ninety-five per cent of the workers at G.E.'s Schenectady plant return to work, defying the national union's continuing strike.

Oct. 28—In Washington, the U.S. Court of Appeals rules 2 to 1 that the Teamsters Union may veto the appointment of Terence McShane as chairman of the monitors of the union, because "his prior activities in connection with this case are a reasonable basis" for their objections to his appointment.

Military

Oct. 1—In Greenland, the Thule radar sentry system begins operations; the North American continent is expected to have between 15 and 24 minutes warning of a ballistic missile attack.

Oct. 3—The administration reveals plans to test possible improvements in underground nuclear explosions detection devices.

Oct. 4—The U.S. Navy claims to have set a world record of 1,390.21 miles an hour for a jet fighter plane.

A 500-pound Courier, a new communications satellite, is orbited from Cape Canaveral.

Oct. 11—An advanced model of an Atlas missile fails.

A Samos reconnaissance satellite fails to orbit.

Oct. 13—Three mice are recovered alive after a 700-mile trip in an Atlas missile nose cone.

Oct. 16—The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions reports that if the arms race continues, Americans will eventually live "underground."

Oct. 19—The nuclear powered submarine Patrick Henry completes her first firing tests successfully; 4 ballistic missiles have been launched from below the surface of the Atlantic off Cape Canaveral.

Oct. 31—The Department of Defense announces that the developmental work on the B-70 supersonic bomber is to be expanded substantially.

Politics

Oct. 4—Republican presidential candidate Vice-President Richard Nixon claims that Senator John Kennedy's farm program will trigger a 25 per cent rise in food prices. Kennedy is the Democratic nominee.

Oct. 7—In the second of four television debates, Nixon and Kennedy argue about the U-2 incident, the defense of Matsu and Quemoy and civil rights.

Oct. 9—Kennedy declares his opposition to resuming underground nuclear weapons tests.

Oct. 11—The Republican National Committee asks Kennedy to apologize for intemperate language used by former President Harry Truman.

Oct. 13—Nixon and Kennedy again argue about the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, government spending, economic growth and other issues in a third television debate.

Henry Cabot Lodge modifies his pledge—made at a Harlem rally (New York) last night—that a Negro will be named to the Cabinet if Nixon wins.

Oct. 16—After a private conference with Lodge, Nixon refuses to commit himself on whether or not he might appoint a Negro to his Cabinet.

Oct. 18—Lodge again predicts that there will be a Negro in the Cabinet if Nixon wins.

Oct. 19—Nixon lists 13 "misstatements and distortions" employed by Kennedy in the campaign.

Oct. 20—A.F.L.-C.I.O. spokesmen in Washington report that 12 unions have officially endorsed Kennedy's candidacy.

Kennedy asks the U.S. to aid Castro's opponents.

Nixon suggests that personal and corporate tax rates should be revised and that lower, broader excise taxes should be instituted to provide incentive for economic growth.

Oct. 21—In their fourth television debate, Kennedy and Nixon argue about policy toward Cuba and the Chinese offshore islands.

Oct. 23—Nixon agrees to a fifth television debate if it is limited to Cuban policy. Kennedy refuses.

Oct. 27—President Eisenhower broadcasts his support for Nixon. Nixon says that if elected he will "carry the message of freedom into the Communist world" by visiting East Europe.

Supreme Court

Oct. 3—The Supreme Court's fall session opens.

Oct. 10—The Court agrees to review a case concerning the right of a privately owned restaurant to refuse to serve Negroes without discrimination.

Oct. 12—Counsel for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Thurgood Marshall argues before the Supreme Court that a bus terminal restaurant must serve Negro interstate passengers, according to the Constitution.

VENEZUELA

Oct. 27—Following 8 days of uninterrupted anti-government outbursts, the government blames left-wing extremists for attempting to overthrow President Romulo Betancourt.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Oct. 26—Celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the Vietnam republic, President Ngo Dinh Diem urges a united struggle to put down rebel activity by the pro-Communist Viet Cong.

YUGOSLAVIA

Oct. 3—Marshal Tito departs from the United Nations.

Oct. 4—Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia sign a 5-year trade pact for an increased exchange of goods.

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1. The names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are: Publisher, Daniel G. Redmond, Jr., 1642 Monk Rd., Gladwyne, Penna.; Editor, Carol L. Thompson, Wolfpit Rd., Norwalk, Conn.; Managing Editor, None; Business Manager, None. 2. The owner is: (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 per cent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual member, must be given.) Current History, Inc., 1822 Ludlow St., Phila. 3, Pa.; Shelby Cullom Davis, Scarborough-on-Hudson, N. Y.; Orin McMillan, 1341 Morrison St., Madison, Wis.; D. G. Redmond, Jr., 1642 Monk Rd., Gladwyne, Pa.; Claire P. Redmond, 30 Westview St., Phila. 19, Pa. The known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 per cent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: (If there are none, so state.) None. 4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 include, in cases where the stockholders or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting; also the statements in the two paragraphs show the affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner.

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